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83 Pages  
Several countries have adopted legal frameworks that recognize ‘nature,’ or nonhuman 
things in ‘nature,’ as rights-bearing entities in their own right. In this thesis, I ask what these laws 
can tell us about the possible political implications of post-humanist perspectives regarding 
nonhuman entities and ‘nature.’ To answer this question, I analyze the similarities and 
differences between recent post-humanist ecological perspectives (Bennett 2010; Latour 2014, 
2004) and indigenous imaginaries that informed rights of nature laws in Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
New Zealand. This comparative analysis reveals a promising path for achieving sustainable 
relationships with nonhuman entities that promote environmental protection. Finally, I discuss 
some of the challenges involved in adopting post-humanist perspectives in the political and legal 
sphere. I conclude that while it is not without obstacles, the inclusion of post-humanist theories 
of ecology in legal frameworks can potentially encourage and reinforce ecologically-minded 
cultural attitudes.  
 
KEYWORDS: Rights of Nature; Post-Humanist Ecology; Indigenous Cosmologies; Vital 
Materialism 
  


















A Thesis Submitted in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Department of Politics and Government 
ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY 
2017 
Copyright 2017 Jaimie Kent 
 
  
























I would first like to thank my thesis chair, Dr. Shapiro, who has been an immense 
inspiration to me. I could not have asked for a better advisor throughout this process and I am 
forever grateful to him for exposing me to the brilliant and intriguing world of political theory. 
He introduced me to post-humanist ecology and several other thought-provoking perspectives, 
allowing me understand the world through a very interesting set of lenses.  
Thank you to Dr. Cox, who supported me and believed in me from day one. She first 
sparked my interest in rights of nature laws and let me endlessly ramble on during frequent visits 
to her office. Thank you to Dr. Shawki, who was my very first mentor at ISU. Her words of 
encouragement have gotten me through numerous hurdles and I am very grateful to her for this. I 
am also greatly indebted to the faculty and staff in the Department of Politics and Government at 
ISU. Every professor I have had has played an integral role shaping me into the truth-seeking 
activist and critic I am today.  
Finally, a quick thanks to my sister Rachel and dear friend Kirsten for supporting me 
throughout this project. They both patiently listened to me rant for hours on end about climate 
change, nonhumans, ‘nature,’ politics, and everything in between.  
Cheers to great professors, great friends, and great family—these lines are often blurred, 
and this research has certainly taught me that lines of separation exist only where we choose to 





                Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i	
CONTENTS ii	
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 1	
CHAPTER II: POST-HUMANIST ECOLOGIES 6	
Bennett’s Vital Materialism: Assemblages and Edible Matter 6	
Latour’s Parliament of Things: The Bifurcation of Nature, Matters of Concern, and 
Spokespersons 11	
Potential Political Implications of Post-Humanist Ecology 19	
CHAPTER III: INDIGENOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES, AND POST-HUMANIST 
ECOLOGIES 22	
Indigenous Amazonian Beliefs and Practices 23	
Corporality and Assemblages 23	
Plants, Shamanism, and Edible Matter 30	
Species Classification and Matters of Concern 35	
Maori Beliefs and Practices 40	
Ecosystems and Assemblages 40	
Ecosystem Health and Matters of Concern 44	
CHAPTER IV: RIGHTS OF NATURE LAW IN ECUADOR, BOLIVIA, AND NEW 
ZEALAND 48	
Rights of Nature in Ecuador 48	
Constitution of Ecuador 49	
 iii 
Implementation and Enforcement 51	
Rights of Nature in Bolivia 54	
Bolivian Law on the Rights of Mother Earth 56	
Implementation and Enforcement 58	
Rights of Nature in New Zealand 60	
Whanganui River Deed of Settlement 62	
Implementation and Enforcement 63	
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 67	
REFERENCES 70	
APPENDIX A: ECUADORIAN CONSTITUTION (EXCERPT) 77	
APPENDIX B: BOLIVIAN LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER EARTH 78	
APPENDIX C: NEW ZEALAND’S WHANGANUI RIVER DEED OF SETTLEMENT 
(EXCERPT) 81	
 1 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
There is broad scientific consensus that human interference in the natural world has 
created the current climate crisis, coupled with what some scientists refer to as the sixth major 
global extinction, defined by the loss of biodiversity. Humans have long interfered with the 
natural world, but the designation of our current geological epoch as the “Anthropocene” calls 
for a new consideration of the ways in which humans, politics, and ecology interact. Several 
states have recently begun to respond to these ecological crises by granting legal personhood to 
nonhuman entities through rights of nature legislation. Meanwhile, political theorists have 
argued for incorporating post-humanist theories of nonhuman agents and processes into the 
practice of politics (Bennett 2012; Latour 2014, 2004). My thesis explores intersections between 
post-humanist ecological theories and rights of nature laws in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New 
Zealand. Specifically, I ask what these rights of nature laws can tell us about the possible 
political implications of post-humanist ecologies. While I find that rights of nature laws reflect 
intersections between post-humanist ecological theories and indigenous conceptions of ‘nature,’ 
there are several concurrent practices that must follow if alternative perspectives regarding 
nonhuman entities are to be embedded in mainstream legal and political discourse. I argue that 
rights of nature laws reveal an evolving political context where post-humanist ecological theories 
merge with western-centered legal frameworks, potentially provoking and reinforcing a new 
ecological-mindedness. 
There has been a lively debate in rights of nature discourse since Christopher Stone’s 
1972 essay, “Should Trees Have a Legal Standing?” However, the passage and implementation 
of rights of nature laws at the state level are a new phenomenon, stemming from indigenous 
peoples’ movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand. In 2008, Ecuador worked the rights 
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of nature into its constitution, granting legal status to all natural entities in ‘nature’ (Akchurin 
2015; Erin Daly 2012). The Ecuadorian constitution recognizes nature’s “right to exist, persist, 
maintain and regenerate its vital cycles” (Chapter XII, Article 71). Following Ecuador’s lead, 
Bolivia hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change in 2010, culminating in the 
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME). The UDRME declares that we 
“are all part of Mother Earth, an indivisible, living community of interrelated and interdependent 
beings with a common destiny” (GARN 2012). Following the World People’s Conference, 
Bolivia passed the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, embracing the main tenets of the UDRME 
(Sheehan 2015; Espinosa 2014). While Ecuador and Bolivia have focused on the broad legal 
rights of nature, New Zealand recently passed a law that provides legal status to the Whanganui 
River (Hsiao 2012; Magallanes 2015). Reached in 2014, the Whanganui River Deed of 
Settlement not only recognizes the river as a “living entity in its own right, incapable of being 
‘owned’ in an absolute sense,” but also as an “indivisible and living whole, from the mountains 
to the sea, incorporating its tributaries and all its physical and metaphysical elements” (Section 
1). Each law attributes legal status to nonhuman entities while recognizing the 
interconnectedness of human and nonhuman bodies, exemplifying how indigenous Amazonians 
and the Maori of New Zealand understand human and nonhuman associations.  
Although my thesis focuses exclusively on the legal status of nonhuman entities in rights 
of nature law, granting legal status to nonhuman entities is not entirely new. Corporations have 
had legal personhood status in the United States since the San Mateo County vs. Southern Pacific 
Rail Road case of 1886. During the case, U.S. Senator Roscoe Conkling argued that the 14th 
amendment, which stipulates that “no state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law,” should not be limited to natural persons (Torres-Spelliscy 2014). 
 3 
Advocates for the rights of animals have also pushed for laws that identify animals as rights 
bearing entities. In the past ten years, France, Germany, New Zealand and Canada have all 
recognized animals as sentient beings, worthy of special legal status (World Animal Protection 
2014). Further, indigenous peoples have long held animist beliefs that do not distinguish 
personhood between humans and nonhumans. For animists, all nonhuman things possess some 
form of sentience and spiritual essence (Harvey 2006).  
Indigenous groups of Amazonia and the Maori of New Zealand follow several tenets of 
animism in their regard for nonhuman entities. Indigenous beliefs about nonhumans and related 
cultural practices in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand played important roles in initiating and 
framing rights of nature laws. For indigenous Amazonians, human and nonhuman identities are 
intertwined in a constantly evolving state of metamorphosis and nonhumans play a significant 
role in communal healing practices. These beliefs translate into rights of nature laws in Ecuador 
and Bolivia, which recognize the deep kinship between indigenous peoples and ‘nature.’ Maori 
beliefs involving ancestral ties to nonhuman entities, and guardianship responsibilities to 
promote a balanced ecosystem also translate directly into New Zealand’s Whanganui River Deed 
of Settlement. Although the legal frameworks in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand focus on 
different aspects of indigenous cosmologies, and have different implementation and enforcement 
mechanisms, they all recognize the importance of nonhuman entities in indigenous ways of life, 
highlighting a new public infusion of liberal and indigenous conceptions of human and 
nonhuman associations.  
A reimagining of human and nonhuman associations has also been under way in so-
called post-humanist theories of political ecology. In chapter II, I explore two prominent 
exemplars of these philosophies, namely Jane Bennett’s (2012) ‘vital materialism’ and Bruno 
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Latour’s (2004; 2014) ‘parliament of things.’ In particular, I interpret Bennett’s notions of 
assemblage and edible matter as well as Latour’s concepts of the bifurcation of nature, matters of 
concern, and spokespersons. My theoretical interpretation of Bennett and Latour’s concepts 
provides the groundwork for comparing post-humanist ecologies with indigenous Amazonian 
and Maori beliefs and practices (chapter III) and rights of nature laws in Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
New Zealand (chapter IV). Post-humanist ecologies and indigenous imaginaries reveal 
alternative ways of reimagining human and nonhuman relationships that are contrary to western, 
anthropocentric views of ‘nature’ and nonhuman entities. The liberal individualism embedded in 
western philosophical traditions designates humans as individual agents whose interests and 
decisions are independent not only from each other, but also from nonhuman entities and 
‘nature.’ Conceiving entities as independent and self-interested reinforces the exploitation of 
non-human beings, or ‘nature’ as a resource for human ends. In this scenario, agency belongs 
specifically to humans and it is only in their instrumental use value that nonhuman things are 
perceived as entities in need of protection. Indigenous practices, beliefs, and post-humanist 
ecological theories challenge these conceptions as they redefine human and nonhuman 
associations, creating a cultural disposition that does not conceive of humans as a dominating 
force over ‘nature,’ and an instrumental resource for exploitation. I highlight how these 
alternative notions are brought into modern political discourse through rights of nature laws, 
revealing several of the conceptual challenges and potential practical applications of post-
humanist ecologies and ultimately answering my research question: What do rights of nature 
laws tell us about the political implications of post-humanist ecologies? (chapter V).  
While post-humanist ecologies challenge western conceptions about ‘nature,’ and the 
interactions of human beings with nonhumans, they have been criticized for presenting 
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themselves as radically new concepts in environmental discourse (Sundberg 2014; Blaser 2014; 
Hunt 2014; Diprose and Bond 2016). As Diprose and Bond (2016) point out, “complex 
understandings of more than human agency as a politicising force exist and are evident in daily 
life within many indigenous communities” (165). Indeed, there are many commonalities between 
post-humanist ecologies and indigenous beliefs and practices. By analyzing rights of nature laws 
in light of post-humanist ecologies, I hope to show that post-humanist ecologies can be effective 
because of their affinities with indigenous cosmologies, not in spite of them. Moreover, 
analyzing post-humanist ecologies through concrete legal frameworks provides a guidepost for 
determining the potential transferability of post-humanist theories into modern ecological 
movements. Nonhuman rights and the rights of nature are relatively new developments, and have 
not yet been embedded in mainstream academic discourse. Furthermore, the political 
implications of Bennett and Latour’s post-humanist ecologies have not been adequately 
explored. This research helps to fill these gaps while also providing new avenues for 
investigating human-nonhuman assemblages as they are continually redefined in theory and 
practice. Finally, this research has broader value in terms of uncovering the ways in which 
humans, politics, and ecology interact. As we move into the unknown terrain of the 
Anthropocene, it is important to engage in new ways of understanding the interplay between 
humans and nonhumans and what these ecological imaginaries mean for our politics. 
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CHAPTER II: POST-HUMANIST ECOLOGIES 
As mentioned above, post-humanist ecologies conceive of human and nonhuman 
associations differently than western traditions that privilege human agency and subjectivity. 
Bennett and Latour both de-center the human as the only actor, arguing that nonhuman entities 
also possess affective capacities and agency. As they emphasize, nonhuman things can not only 
shape and influence human dispositions, but they can also disrupt and reconfigure the trajectories 
of human intentions. Indeed, interactions between humans and nonhumans are not static, one-
directional causalities, but dynamic processes. This section will serve as a guidepost for the rest 
of the paper—a reference point to which I frequently return throughout the chapters that follow. 
Here, I will unpack Jane Bennett’s (2010) concept of assemblage, focusing on her discussion of 
edible matter and Bruno Latour’s (2004; 2014) discussion of the bifurcation of nature dilemma, 
matters of concern, and spokespersons. I then discuss what Bennett and Latour see as the 
potential virtues of post-humanist theories of ecology before comparing their concepts to 
indigenous beliefs and practices in the next chapter.    
Bennett’s Vital Materialism: Assemblages and Edible Matter 
Jane Bennett’s (2010) concepts of assemblage and edible matter are part of her larger 
project in which she asks: “How would political responses to public problems change were we to 
take seriously the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies?” (vii). The word vitality refers to the “capacity 
of things—edibles, commodities, storms metals—not only to impede or block the will and 
designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or 
tendencies of their own” (viii). I describe below how nonhuman things engage as vital 
materialities in an assemblage and how vital materiality works in Bennett’s example of edible 
matter. Bennett’s assemblages involve interactions between various human and nonhuman 
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entities, where nonhuman things possess agency as ‘actants.’ Bennett borrows the term ‘actant’ 
from Bruno Latour for whom it is “something that acts or is something to which its activity is 
granted by others” (75). Further, Bennett quotes Gilles Deleuze, for whom “the power of a body 
to affect other bodies includes a ‘corresponding and inseparable’ capacity to be affected”, as 
“there are two equally actual powers, that of acting, and that of suffering action” (2010, 22). 
While nonhuman actants can affect and be affected in turn, their affective capacities and agency 
can be transformed and even enhanced when they are part of an assemblage constituted by 
various other actants. A vital materialist’s conception of agency is quite different from traditional 
forms of agency for several reasons. From a vital materialist perspective, agency is distributed 
across both human and nonhuman actants that are engaged in an assemblage. Bennett’s 
description of an electrical power grid illustrates this point:    
To the vital materialist, the electrical grid is better understood as a volatile mix of  coal, 
sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, profit  motives, heat, 
lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, economic 
theory, wire, and wood—to name just some of the actants (25).  
As Bennett argues, the distribution of actants in an electric grid assemblage is especially 
noticeable in times of crisis, which was the case on the day of the Great North American 
Blackout of 2003:  
What seems to have happened on that August day was that several initially unrelated 
generator withdrawals in Ohio and Michigan caused the electron flow pattern to change 
over the transmission lines, which led, after a series of events including one brush fire 
that burnt a transmission line and then several wire-tree-encounters, to a successive 
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overloading of other lines… [causing] one generating plant after another to separate from 
the grid (25).  
The Great North American Blackout was not caused by one actor or actant alone, but rather by a 
cascade of actants. This example demonstrates how the affective capacities of nonhumans can 
generate dynamic effects in an assemblage. 
Because “power is not distributed evenly across the surface of an assemblage,” vital 
materialism suggests that nonhuman actants can sometimes possess greater agency than human 
actors (24). An uneven distribution of agency has implications for human intentions as well as 
hierarchal, subject-object formulations of power relationships. The perception of nonhuman 
things as mute, static objects, consequently imbues humans with unique capacities of efficacy 
and action, ultimately solidifying the assumption that humans have power over other entities. 
Bennett’s account of assemblage breaks down this construction. On the one hand, it suggests that 
human intention is always at risk of being blunted, or even transformed by other actants in the 
assemblages of which they are part. On the other hand, it assumes that power arrangements 
between people and nonhuman actants are often not hierarchal, and that humans are not always 
at the top. In this way, “intention is like a pebble thrown into a pond, or an electric current sent 
through a wire or neural network: it vibrates and merges with other currents, to affect and be 
affected” (32).  
Rather than viewing humans as solitary agents, who act upon the passive world around 
them, vital materialism proposes that humans and nonhumans are in a constant flux of dynamic 
relationships. However, Bennett makes clear that the “political goal of vital materialism is not 
the perfect equality of actants, but a polity with more channels of communication between 
members” (141). Below, I explore how Latour’s ‘parliament of things’ provides a means for 
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bringing nonhuman entities into our politics, and opening up these “channels of communication 
between members.” It is through an awareness of the vitality of nonhuman entities that a shift in 
perspective occurs for Bennett. Although “humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an 
intricate dance with each other” and there “was never a time when human agency was anything 
other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity,” it is our recognition of the 
inexorable linkages between humans and nonhumans that we can build an ecologically-minded 
politics (31). Bennett’s description of edible matter exemplifies potential lines of communication 
and “interfolding networks of humanity and nonhumanity” that affect our outward actions and 
dispositions.    
More than blocking intentions, distributed actants can form and transform them. As 
Bennett points out, food is an “actant inside and alongside intention-forming, morality-
(dis)obeying, language-using, reflexivity-wielding, and culture-making human beings,” and is an 
“inducer-producer of salient, public effects” (39). Edible matter acts quite literally within and 
through the human body, engaging in biological and chemical interactions that affect human 
thinking and volition. Bennett’s description of the efficacy of fat helps to elucidate this point.  
She writes, “food coacts with the hand that places it in one’s mouth” as the “metabolic agencies 
of intestines, pancreas, kidneys... and cultural practices of physical exercise,” ultimately generate 
“new human tissue” (40). More surprisingly, so-called good fats, such as omega-3 fatty acids 
“can make prisoners less prone to violent acts, schoolchildren better able to focus, and bipolar 
persons less depressed” (41). In this way, fats can not only change one’s physical appearance, 
but also their dispositions and sensibilities. As Bennett puts it, lipids can “promote particular 
human moods or affective states” (41).  
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Taking nonhuman things like fat and other edible matter under consideration and 
acknowledging their capacity to shape human dispositions helps to reveal the significant effects 
of nonhuman actants in an assemblage. The ability of nonhuman things, such as fatty acids, to 
alter human states of mind, has real implications for the ways in which we interact socially and 
politically. If we are to thoroughly investigate social and political problems, it is not enough that 
we look at “economic-cultural prostheses” (43). We must instead explore the “strivings and 
trajectories of fats as they weaken or enhance the power of human wills, habits, and ideas” (43). 
For example, understanding how propensity for violence changes according to the intake of 
omega-3 fatty acids can implicate theories of criminal responsibility and change prison diets.  
Another implication of this perspective is that agency does not require political and social 
objectives to produce social and political effects. Bennett uses the example of population 
disbursement to illustrate this point. Although people tend to “distribute themselves into racially 
and economically segregated neighborhoods,” they are usually following cultural trends, and do 
not “intend, endorse, or even consider” their impact on political effects such as “municipal 
finances, crime rates, and transportation policy” (98). This interpretation of agency is useful in 
understanding how nonhuman entities can produce political effects through “cultural trends.” 
That is, if we become conscious of the ways in which we interact with nonhuman entities, we 
can create a cultural disposition that fosters guardianship of nonhuman things in ‘nature.’ 
Moreover, if we understand that nonhuman entities share agency with humans, it becomes the 
self interest of humans to consider how we affect and are affected by nonhuman forces. While 
Bennett’s concepts of assemblage and edible matter provide a backdrop for understanding how 
nonhuman entities achieve efficacy and agency, Latour’s concepts of the bifurcation of nature, 
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matters of concern, and spokespersons identify possible avenues for including nonhuman entities 
in our politics.   
Latour’s Parliament of Things: The Bifurcation of Nature, Matters of Concern, and 
Spokespersons 
Latour’s (2014; 2004) account of a ‘parliament of things’ provides a framework for 
ending what he calls the ‘bifurcation’ between facts and values that constrains efforts to bring 
nonhuman entities into public discourse. Building a parliament of things involves achieving a 
democracy where nonhuman entities are recognized as participants in shaping collective life 
(2004, 54). Latour imagines a parliament where humans and nonhumans engage with each other 
through associations, much like Bennett’s assemblages explained above. Ultimately, there can be 
no bifurcation between humans and nonhumans if both are continuously affecting and being 
affected by one another. Latour’s concept of “matters of concern”—which he substitutes for 
“matters of fact”— works to bring nonhuman entities that affect us through their actions, into a 
parliament of things through “due process.” For nonhuman entities to enter our politics as 
matters of concern and to effectively end the bifurcation of nature, we will need what Latour 
calls ‘spokespersons’ for nonhuman entities.  
For Latour, the bifurcation of nature separates matters of fact from questions of value. On 
the one hand, it supposes that there is a factual reality that we can get to know through our 
science, a reality that involves an ontology of things. On the other hand, it supposes that human 
values play a role in prioritizing what is important for collective life. In a bifurcated nature, 
values do not inform facts, and we are not conscious of the ways in which values and human 
interventions influence our supposed facts. In this way, human experience becomes isolated from 
nonhuman things and ‘nature,’ with human experience appearing as processes of value and our 
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understanding of nonhuman entities appearing as factual realities that we come to know through 
our science. Latour (2014) cites Alfred N. Whitehead to help unpack the bifurcation between 
ontological facts and human experience. Whitehead describes the bifurcated image that isolates 
human experience from the activities of nonhuman entities:  
Bodies are perceived as with qualities which in reality do not belong to them, qualities 
which in fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature gets credit which should 
in truth be reserved for ourselves; the rose for its scent; the nightingale for his song; and 
the sun for his radiance. The poets are entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics 
to themselves, and should turn them into odes of self-congratulation on the excellence of 
the human mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colorless; merely the 
hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly (Latour 2014, 93; Whitehead, SMW, 54).  
Latour and Whitehead both reject the bifurcation of nature in which meaning is created through a 
human perspective isolated from the world it interprets. Instead, we must merge human 
experience and factual knowledge of nonhuman things to generate a clearer picture of how 
humans and things interact and affect each other. If we do not take these associations into 
account, we are left only with the choice between “either the meaninglessness of the senseless 
but real nature or the meaninglessness of the meaningful but unreal values” (2014, 95). Latour 
rejects the bifurcation of nature and envisages a collective life that does not disregard values or 
experience for the sake of facts. Facts and values are both necessary for highlighting the 
processes whereby matters of concern appear, and include both human and nonhuman actants.  
According to Latour (2004), we must rethink the way in which we conduct physical 
science because it does not provide us with a complete narrative, i.e. one which includes the 
procedures and interactions that link humans and nonhumans. Latour clarifies this point:  
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As soon as we add to dinosaurs their paleontologists, to particles their accelerators, to 
ecosystems their monitoring instruments, to energy systems their standards, and the 
hypothesis on the basis of which calculations are made, to the ozone holes their 
meteorologists and their chemists, we have already ceased entirely to speak of nature; 
instead, we are speaking of what is produced, constructed, decided, defined, in a learned 
City whose ecology is almost as complex as that of the world it is coming to know (35).   
Building a parliament of things through a democracy of humans and nonhumans, helps to ensure 
that we are not merely defining what ‘nature’ is through our science, but that we take into 
account the procedures, hypotheses, machines, and other instruments that all work together to 
construct our collective life. Latour outlines the importance of appealing to matters of concern 
over matters of fact, as matters of concern allow us to “consult with objects” when necessary and 
respond to them accordingly (170).   
Because it is difficult to consult with all nonhuman entities, Latour presents a compelling 
case for a “collective experimentation process” which allows us to consult with nonhuman things 
insofar as they affect humans. Consultation is a process of contestation as there are different 
perspectives from which we can understand how nonhuman entities affect and interact with our 
human societies. Latour’s “collective experimentation” process takes the agency of nonhuman 
actants into account and involves assemblages between humans and nonhumans much like 
Bennett’s vital materiality. He defines collective experimentation as follows:  
When it is no longer possible to define a single nature and multiple cultures, the 
collective has to explore the question of the number of entities to be taken into account 
and integrated, through a groping process whose protocol is defined by the power to 
follow up. From the word “experimentation” as it is used in the sciences, I borrow the 
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following: it is instrument-based, rare, difficult to reproduce, always contested; and it 
presents itself as a costly trial whose result has to be decoded (2004, 238).  
Latour is describing the inclusion of nonhuman entities in a democratic practice where the 
actions of nonhuman entities appear as matters of concern to people rather than as independent 
facts. There are two important features of matters of concern that are important to point out. 
 First, matters of concern are not to be confused with matters of fact as they appear and 
disappear from collective life and are not to be viewed as a concrete, or inactive state of things. 
Indeed, Latour cautions that matters of fact can become dangerous for collective life:  
The use of the term ‘fact’ without further precautions to designate one of the territories 
outlined by the frontier between facts and values completely obscures the immense 
diversity of scientific activity and obliges all facts, in every stage of their production, to 
become fixed, as if they had already reached their definitive state (2004, 96).  
Latour is describing what is left out when matters of fact are relied upon to articulate problems 
that arise for collective life. Facts, when taken by themselves, tend to obscure the process by 
which they have been generated, i.e. the scientific work and tools used to fabricate a particular 
object of knowledge and site of action. Further, facts leave no room for values although it is 
values that designate the trajectory of facts. These “territories outlined by the frontier between 
facts and values” are what we must pay attention to (96). That is, what is of concern to collective 
life is what gets explored in the first place, and even then, we must be cautious that our facts do 
not get in the way of how interactions between humans and nonhumans fluctuate. Matters of fact 
are settled and irrefutable, whereas, matters of concern are controversial and take under 
consideration the variable ways humans and nonhuman entities affect and are affected by one 
another. In other words, because a matter of concern is “recalcitrant does not in any way mean 
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that it is objective or certain, or even indisputable” (103). In actuality, a matter of concern 
“agitates, troubles, complicates, provokes speech, [and] may arouse a lively controversy” (103). 
Second, and relatedly, when matters of concern appear as propositions to human 
societies, they require a new understanding of human and nonhuman associations in which 
science itself must be re-articulated. Latour uses the example of prions to clarify this point. The 
discovery of prions as the “unconventional proteins that appear responsible for mad cow disease” 
became a matter of concern for collective life as the disease affected cows, people, farming 
practices, economies, and so on (111). It is not sufficient to turn only to biologists when dealing 
with issues such as prions. We must instead consult a number of parties, who are all representing 
different interests and perspectives. We must ask ourselves, “how can we arrange in order of 
importance the beef market… the slaughter caused by automobiles, the taste of vegetarians… the 
income of my farmer neighbors… the Nobel Prize awarded…to Professor Stanley E. Prusiner, 
one of the discoverers of prions?” (113). Certainly, we cannot “homogenize the voices that 
participated in the power to take into account” matters of concern just as we should not 
“homogenize those which participate in the power” to prioritize what is important for collective 
life (113). For Latour, understanding a matter of concern becomes more holistic when we consult 
with all of the human and nonhuman actants involved. This consultation process eventually leads 
to a more effective response, or what Latour calls ‘institutional closure’—a temporary solution 
that best addresses the current issue.  
 For Latour, governing a polity that consists of human and nonhuman actants involves the 
process of taking matters of concern into account, putting them in order, and following-up by 
acting accordingly. For example, water contamination is a matter of concern, and when 
addressed through collective experimentation, entails that we understand the trajectories of 
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human and nonhuman actants that worked together to create the issue. We can consult with 
stakeholders, both human and nonhuman, to understand why water contamination may have 
occurred for the benefit of some, but detriment to others, and we can use this knowledge to 
inform our decision-making. In this way, “political ecology does not shift attention from the 
human pole to the pole of nature; it shifts from certainty about the production of risk-free objects 
(with their clear separation between things and people) to uncertainty about the relations whose 
unintended consequences threaten to disrupt all orderings, all plans, all impacts” (2004, 25). 
Appealing to matters of concern over matters of fact helps to establish a parliament of things that 
overcomes the bifurcation between facts and values, bridging the divide between human and 
nonhuman things in the process. Instead of relying solely on matters of fact to guide our 
decision-making, Latour’s concept of matters of concern allow us to recognize, accept, and 
legitimize the agency of nonhuman things, eventually allowing them to become “registered as 
full-fledged members of collective life” (104). While it is true that we cannot bring every 
nonhuman entity into a parliament of things, we can certainly include them according to the 
“specific problems that they raised for the collective,” just as prions were articulated only after 
the onset of mad cow disease (169).  
For Latour (2004), spokespersons are essential for including nonhuman entities as “full-
fledged members of collective life” (104). He defines spokespersons as follows: 
[Spokespersons are] an expression used at first to show the profound kinship between 
representatives of humans (in the political sense) and representatives of nonhumans (in 
the epistemological sense). Next, the term is used to designate all the speech 
impedimenta that explain the dynamics of the collective. The spokesperson is precisely 
the one who does not permit an assured answer to the question ‘who is speaking’? (250).  
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Latour’s description of the kinship between human and nonhuman representatives conforms with 
his criticism of the fact-value dichotomy described above. After we move past matters of fact 
and appeal instead to matters of concern, it becomes clear that old styles of representation do not 
suffice in consulting with nonhuman entities and bringing them into the collective. Whereas the 
old designation of value was given through political discussion and fact through scientific 
inquiry, Latour’s spokespersons collaborate between the two domains, at the same time 
acknowledging what they do not and cannot know. Traditionally, science and politics have been 
at odds with one another rather than working together to consult all relevant stakeholders:   
[B]etween the speaking subject of the political tradition and the mute things of the 
epistemological tradition, there was always a third term, indisputable speech, a 
previously invisible form of political and scientific life that made it possible sometimes to 
transform mute things into ’speaking facts,’ and sometimes to make speaking subjects 
mute by requiring them to bow down before nondiscussable matters of fact (68).   
Instead of restricting discussion, Latour’s spokespersons recognize what he calls, the ‘speech 
impedimenta,’ or rather—the limits of representation that occur when they speak on behalf of 
other entities. Latour’s description of “lab coats” helps to clarify this point. 
 While spokespersons from the scientific community are important for the collective, we 
must still question their speech and ask how it is that they generate their speech. Latour points 
out that, “the lab coats are the spokespersons of the nonhumans, and, as is the case with all 
spokespersons, we have to entertain serious but not definitive doubts about their capacity to 
speak in the name of those they represent” (64-65). That is, while scientific information is an 
invaluable tool for articulating matters of concern, it often does not reveal the entire story. 
Certainly, lab coats do not “speak on their own about mute things” (67). On the contrary, they 
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have “invented speech prostheses that allow nonhumans to participate in the discussions of 
humans, when humans become perplexed about the participation of new entities in collective 
life” (67). We must carefully pay attention to what is lost when we employ “speech prostheses” 
to nonhuman entities. After all, “things become, in the laboratory, by means of instruments, 
relevant to what we say about them” (67). What we can do is be aware of our intervention in the 
process of speaking for nonhumans as our desires, interests, and cultural attitudes are intermixed 
with how we interpret nonhuman perspectives. In this way, spokespersons do not claim to speak 
directly for anybody or anything, but instead acknowledge their own shortcomings in speaking 
on behalf of their constituents.    
Latour’s collective not only redistributes “speech between humans and nonhumans, but 
also learns to be “skeptical of all spokespersons—those who represent humans as well as those 
who represent nonhumans” (2004, 232). Because politics and epistemology are intertwined in the 
collective, interests can always be modified and compromise is always an option. In this way, a 
spokesperson’s role is not rigid, but collaborative, as they have power to “modify those whose 
opinion they are supposed to represent faithfully” (146). Latour’s parliament of things provides a 
path toward a collective life in which human and nonhuman entities can all be engaged in the 
political process. Latour goes so far as to say that to limit “discussion to humans, their interests, 
their subjectivities, and their rights, will appear as strange a few years from now as having 
denied the right to vote of slaves, poor people, or women” (69). Latour’s discussion of the 
bifurcation of nature, matters of concern, and spokespersons suggests that the inclusion of 
nonhuman entities in collective life can be beneficial for both humans and nonhumans.   
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Potential Political Implications of Post-Humanist Ecology 
 Bennett and Latour both propose a political ecology in which we not only recognize the 
agency of nonhuman entities, but also include this understanding of agency in our political 
decision-making. Bennett asks: “Would a discursive shift from environmentalism to vital 
materialism enhance the prospects for a more sustainably-oriented public? (2010, 111). Bennett 
proposes that a new kind of ecologically-minded politics can develop from recognizing the 
efficacy and agency of nonhuman entities. Instead of promoting an environmentalism which 
aims to protect and preserve a distant ‘nature,’ vital materialism reveals the interconnection 
between human actors and nonhuman actants and suggests that we should not separate the two 
domains. In fact, vital materialism provides the groundwork for the “self of a new self-interest” 
by reminding us of the “very radical character of the (fractious) kinship between the human and 
nonhuman” (Bennett 2010, 112-113). Bennett suggests that a cultural shift can occur when we 
see the world through the lens of vital materialism, and this shift can inform a new ecologically 
sustainable politics.  
 Bennett compares the potential societal effects of vital materialism to Félix Guattari’s 
description of how ‘Integrated World Capitalism’ (IWC) works, indicating that our conception of 
nonhuman agency implicates our politics: 
 It is precisely because IWC works by appropriating bodily affect and channeling 
 unconscious intensities that a greener self-culture-nature will require not only new ‘laws, 
 decrees and bureaucratic programmes’ but ‘new micropolitical and microsocial practices, 
 new solidarities, a new gentleness, together with new aesthetic and new analytic practices 
 regarding the formation of the unconscious.’ (114).  
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Our conceptions of nonhuman entities, and ‘nature’ inform our aesthetic and analytic styles. 
Vital materialism and post-humanist theories of ecology more broadly, tell us that we are 
connected to lively nonhuman entities who can and do affect us, and this knowledge can inform 
an ecological-mindedness which implicates our social and political practices. That is, when we 
conceive of ourselves as being part of ‘nature’ and inexorably linked to nonhuman entities, our 
priorities and value judgments shift not only on a personal and social level, but also on a political 
level. In this way, ecological problems are “as much a matter of culture-and-psyche-formation as 
[they are] of watershed management and air quality protection” (114).  
 Where Bennett envisions a post-humanist ecology that creates normative shifts within 
society that then influence politics, Latour’s reformulation of political ecology and democracy as 
a ‘parliament of things’ focuses on the organization of the sciences and politics. By redefining 
the role of the sciences to speak on behalf of nonhuman human entities and incorporating their 
viewpoints in our politics, we can build a more ecologically-minded democracy. Bennett and 
Latour both envision a new environmentalism in which ecological sustainability grows from 
within a new conception of the human relationship with nonhuman entities. Latour asks: “if we 
assure ourselves that humans no longer engage in their politics without nonhumans, is this not 
what the ‘green’ movements have always sought, behind the awkward formulas involving the 
‘protection’ or the ‘preservation’ of ‘nature’? (2004, 226). When we understand ourselves 
through the lens of post-humanist ecology, we become aware that we are part of ‘nature,’ 
interacting with and alongside a variety of nonhuman actants. Most importantly, Bennett and 
Latour’s ecologies tell us that sustainable ecological practices can flourish, not as an ethical 
responsibility to protect a ‘nature’ which we control and manage, but because we must protect 
ourselves as situated actors within it.  
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Comparing Bennett and Latour’s concepts with indigenous beliefs and practices reveals 
how cultural attitudes regarding nonhumans can influence ecological practices and politics. In 
the next chapter, I compare and contrast indigenous Amazonian and Maori practices and beliefs 
with Bennett’s concept of assemblage generally and her discussion of edible matter in particular, 
as well as Latour’s description of the bifurcation of nature, matters of concern, and 
spokespersons. While the indigenous people and rights of nature movements under study are not 
based in post-humanist thought and terminology, they make for compelling and informative 
cases of comparison. Furthermore, they provide key terms and concepts for legal recognitions of 
nonhuman entities and agents. Thus, they provide an occasion to evaluate several possible 





CHAPTER III: INDIGENOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES, AND POST-HUMANIST 
ECOLOGIES 
Before considering the implications of post-humanist ecologies in connection with rights 
of nature laws, it is necessary to trace intersections with indigenous beliefs and practices from 
which rights of nature laws have been born in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand. Indigenous 
populations in Ecuador and Bolivia dwell in the overlapping Andean and Amazon Basin regions 
of South America. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘Amazonians’ and ‘indigenous 
peoples of Amazonia’ will refer to indigenous groups who inhabit these specific regions. The 
comparative analyses that follow will not only be useful for interpreting how post-humanist 
ecologies can inform environmental practice, but will also provide a lens from which to 
understand the political implications of rights of nature laws in chapter four. Below, I analyze 
indigenous Amazonian and Maori beliefs and practices in light of concepts borrowed from Jane 
Bennett’s (2010) ‘vital materialism’ and Bruno Latour’s (2014) ‘parliament of things.’ 
Specifically, I compare indigenous Amazonian views of the body with Bennett’s interpretation 
of assemblage, shamanic medicinal practices with her concept of edible matter, and species 
classification schemes with Latour’s description of ‘matters of concern.’ Next, I compare the 
Maori understanding of ecosystems with Bennett’s concept of assemblage and their practices 
involving ‘mauri’—or life force—with Latour’s ‘matters of concern.’ These comparisons will 
reveal how post-humanist ecologies can inform a more ecologically-minded politics as 
indigenous practices and beliefs exist as a “set of relays between moral contents, aesthetic-
affective styles, and public moods” (Bennett, xii). For Bennett and Latour, politics are implicated 
in our very conception of ‘nature’ as our understanding of nonhuman agency affects how we 
bring nonhuman entities into public and legal discourse. Indigenous Amazonian and Maori 
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beliefs and practices reveal how ecological responsibility and guardianship might develop from a 
cultural positioning that gives nonhuman entities their due.  
Indigenous Amazonian Beliefs and Practices 
 Indigenous Amazonian beliefs and practices concerning the body, shamanic healing, and 
species classification systems reveal a relational understanding of humans and nonhumans in 
which nonhuman entities are often perceived as part and parcel to community life. I discuss these 
practices and beliefs in terms of how they might contribute to an ecological orientation 
predicated on the responsibility to protect nonhuman entities as a matter of human interest and 
inherent guardianship. The relational conception of humans and nonhumans in Amazonia is 
contrary to modern, anthropocentric claims that posit human subjectivity as separate from 
nonhuman things. Whereas modern understandings of human and nonhuman associations view 
relations as secondary qualities, indigenous Amazonians view these relationships as constituting 
the actual entities involved. When humans are viewed as distinct from other entities, it 
encourages domination and exploitation over ‘nature’ and its resources. Amazonians, however, 
have a predisposition toward the protection of ‘nature’ because their identities and cultural 
practices are based in human and nonhuman interactions. While conceptions of the body, 
communal healing practices, and species classification all exhibit a relational conception of 
human and nonhuman entities analogous to that described by Bennett and Latour, species 
classification will reveal potential differences concerning the processes by which nonhumans 
enter politics as ‘matters of concern’ in the indigenous context.  
Corporality and Assemblages 
As detailed in chapter one, assemblages involve human and nonhuman actants who affect 
and are affected by one another, often through dynamic process and relationships. In this 
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scenario, agency is distributed across many bodies and forces, governed by a relational context in 
which human and nonhuman things frequently engage with each another. Indigenous Amazonian 
views of the body provide an example of how a conception of distributive agency can implicate 
human practices and beliefs. In what follows, I examine how the Wari people of Bolivia interpret 
the body in terms of its relational and transformative properties.  
What I find most interesting about the Wari conception of the body is that for them, the 
body is in a constant state of metamorphosis, depending upon its interactions. Aparecida Vilaca 
(2005) points out that “Amazonian ethnographies have shown how the body is slowly and 
continuously fabricated in a constant flow involving nutrition, abstention, the application of 
medicines, body painting, baptismal rituals, and formal training” (447). There is no single or 
static definition for what the body is in Wari culture. The Wari concepts of ‘kwere’ and ‘jam’ 
reveal how the Wari imagine a body as an assemblage rather than a static and individual entity—
one constituted through its relationships with other, sometimes nonhuman, entities.  
Although ‘kwere’ translates to English as ‘body,’ it has very different connotations in 
Wari culture. According to Vilaca (2005), the Wari body is constituted by affects and memories 
rather than independent and continuous physical properties. In fact, memory is “located in the 
body, meaning the constitution of kin is based to a high degree on living alongside each other 
day-to-day and on reciprocally bestowed acts of affection and care.” (Vilaca, 449). It is not along 
biological lines that the Wari understand the body but through various interactions that affect and 
change it. In this way, kwere is a disposition, implying a “more specific mode of acting and “set 
of affections or ways of being rather than a physical substrate” (Vilaca, 450). The link between 
memory and kinship exemplifies these “set of affections” as memory is constituted in individual 
experience, indicating that lines of kinship are contingent upon the unique relationships that 
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entities share. Likewise, kwere is not a “substance impregnated with dispositions and affects,” 
but rather a “way of being actualized in bodily form” (Vilaca, 451). In this way, the body is not a 
starting point, but is fabricated based on “the negation of the possibilities of the non-human 
body” (Vilaca, 451). That is, an entity is defined by the behaviors of other entities that act upon 
and engage with it. These ‘modes of acting’ are not limited to humans as “things, like persons, 
are constituted within relations” with kwere “appearing as the outcome of the latter” (Vilaca, 
456). Viveiros de Castro (2002) points out how this state of flux can be somewhat unnerving 
when determining lines of kinship:  
 Metamorphosis is something that haunts the native imagination. Hence, although making 
kinship is a way of ensuring forms, if we consider that kin are made out of others, there 
always exists a latent possibility of alteration – that is, of kin revealing themselves to be 
as they were or as they really are. Alterity, not identity, is the default state in Amazonia 
(391).  
While a grandfather might be considered a grandfather to a particular person due to close 
proximity and affectionate care as detailed above, that same person may have been grandfather 
to several other people or will be at different times depending on circumstance, not genealogical 
record. When lines of kinship and identify are perceived as malleable, they fit more readily into 
Bennett and Deleuze’s description of affective bodies, with the only constant in both cases being 
the potential for transformation.  
Vilaca’s description of kwere and de Castro’s example of kinship is echoed in Bennett’s 
description of “affective bodies” interacting in an assemblage. The body understood as kwere, is 
neither a subject or object, but as Bennett insists, a mode which can “mod(e)ify and be modified 
by others” (23). The modifying capacity of affective bodies to affect others and be affected in 
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turn is comparable to the Wari conception of memory and kinship. Memory is created through 
affective relationships which compose an individual’s experience and form one’s disposition. In 
this case, memory is a substrate of lines of kinship in Wari culture as it is through past 
experiences of interaction that familial lines are drawn.  
For the Wari people, rocks, stones, water, animals, and even wind can all possess their 
own unique dispositions and affective capacities (Vilaca, 448). What differentiates one bodily 
form from another is therefore measured by how it engages with other bodies, both human and 
nonhuman. Descola (1996) points out the similarities between how humans and nonhumans are 
conceived in Amazonia:  
The nature-culture dichotomy [is] an inadequate or misleading tool to account for  the 
 ways in which the people… [talk] about and interact with their physical environment… 
 Not only do they [indigenous peoples of Amazonia] commonly attribute human 
 dispositions and behaviours to plants and animals—but they also expand the realm of 
 what are, for us, non-human living organisms to include spirits, monsters, artefacts, 
 minerals or any entity endowed with defining properties such as conscience, a soul, a 
 capacity to communicate, mortality, the ability to grow, a social conduct, a moral  code, 
 etc. (82). 
The anthropomorphizing of nonhumans is not surprising considering that indigenous 
Amazonians define entities based on their relationships to one another rather than on physical or 
biological properties. Marilyn Strathern (1999) helps clarify this point:  
[H]umanity, and thus a division between humans and others, is not the principal 
ontological axis. I do not think that the difference between ‘spirit’ and ‘animal’ or 
‘human’ has been the archetype for perspectival traffic in the Amazonian sense. Rather, it 
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is persons who offer perspectives on one another. By this I mean that the significant lines 
are internal, between beings as distinctive social entities, that is, between types or kinds, 
distinguished by their relationships with one another (252).  
The “types or kinds” of relationships Strathern is referring to are what set entities apart from one 
another. Entities are not identified by clearly defined bodies, such as nonhuman animal, thing, or 
human, but rather by relationships that affect their dispositions. Thus, bodily form appears as an 
effect of processes of interaction, not as a precursor to them. For example, Amazonians might 
designate a rock as a tool, but they are aware that the same rock might be building material for 
birds, or a valuable component in soil and river systems. In this way, bodies are understood not 
only by their physical qualities, but also by their different experiences, much as lines of kinship 
are determined. Just as lines of kinship are drawn differently depending upon specific affective 
relationships, nonhuman entities can also be defined according to other sets of affective 
potentials in the assemblages of which they are part.  
Humans and nonhumans are not considered separate and distinct entities within 
Amazonian cultures, but are instead understood through the perspective of the observer. That is, 
who is watching dictates what an entity is. For example, the Wari know that “what blood is 
depends on who is looking… for jaguars, for example, blood is beer.” (Vilaca, 457). The identity 
of entities is understood through the Wari concept of ‘jam’ which “implies the capacity to 
‘jamu’, a verb which means to transform, especially in the sense of extraordinary action” 
(Vilaca, 452). Jamu indicates a capacity to “adopt other habits, thus enabling the [entity] to be 
perceived as a similar by other types of beings” (Vilaca, 452). The transformational quality of 
jamu can be interpreted as the interplay between actants, where human and nonhuman 
participants are in a constant state of dynamic interactions in which action by one member may 
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not only change the course of another entity, but may actually change its very nature. Indeed, as 
Vilaca points out, “transformation may always be the result of the agency of other subjects rather 
than ego’s desire” (453). In this view, one can never be sure what a human or nonhuman thing is 
completely, as its relational capacities are never fully exhausted. 
 Classifying human and nonhumans from the perspective of their engagements with other 
entities can help us move away from our human-centeredness, which may be alarming and 
uncomfortable, but also practical. When we take into account the perspectives of nonhuman 
entities, we alert ourselves to events that may have been unforeseen through a solely human lens 
and produce more proactive policies as a result. Further, Bennett’s discussion of 
anthropomorphism tells us that relational views allow us to perceive affinities between humans 
and nonhumans which can engender care and sympathy. In Wari culture, there is a sense of 
personal responsibility to protect nonhuman entities as they are inherently tied-in with humans 
through their interaction in assemblages. While humans may not perceive their blood as being 
beer, it is important to remain cognizant of how we are situated among various other entities, 
each with different needs and trajectories of action, that can and do affect us. Conversely, jaguars 
do not know what beer is, and do not literally perceive blood as beer in the human sense, but this 
anthropomorphizing of the jaguar’s experience is crucial in recognizing the interconnectedness 
of human and nonhuman entities. Bennett explains the importance of anthropomorphism at 
length:  
 In a vital materialism, an anthropomorphic element in perception can uncover a whole 
world of resonances and resemblances—sounds and sights that echo and bounce far more 
than would be possible were the universe to have a hierarchal structure. We at first may 
see only a world in our own image, but what appears next is a swarm of ‘talented’ and 
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vibrant materialities (including the seeing self). A touch of anthropomorphism, then, can 
catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of 
beings (subjects and objects) but with variously composed materialities that form 
confederations. In revealing similarities across categorical divides and lighting up 
structural parallels between material forms in ‘nature’ and those in ‘culture,’ 
anthropomorphism can reveal isomorphisms (99).   
In Bennett’s view, anthropomorphizing provides a conceptual tool that enables us to perceive the 
experience of nonhumans as similar to those of humans. From this vantage point, we can begin 
to create a more ecologically-minded politics. If we attribute human qualities to nonhuman 
things we can begin to see ourselves outside of our supposed uniquely subjective human 
experience while instilling a sense of equality between people and things. Nonhumans, 
recognized as actors in themselves, and as vital participants in identity formation, further 
promote a flattening out between humans and nonhumans that can create an ecologically aware 
disposition. When we perceive ourselves as similar to rather than distant from nonhuman 
entities, we are in a better position to care for the well-being of ‘nature’ which we all inhabit and 
to view ecological issues from a more than human lens.  
The Wari concepts of ‘kwere’ and ‘jam’ exemplify Bennett’s political goal of creating a 
“polity with more channels of communication between members” (141). The way in which the 
Wari people understand kinship and human and nonhuman bodily forms takes into account lines 
of communication between entities to the extent that these relationships form their identities. 
Indeed, Bennett’s call for “action and responsibility that crosses the human-nonhuman divide,” 
consistently plays out in Wari culture (2010, 24). For the Wari, one cannot label a human or 
nonhuman without understanding the ways in which they affect and are affected by other 
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entities. Their conception of the body opens up new avenues for consideration regarding the 
human responsibility to protect the life and well-being of nonhuman entities. If human action and 
identity are understood through their entanglements with nonhuman agents, it is in the human 
interest to protect the integrity of all those things that constitute our identity. Ecological 
protection takes on a different form of responsibility in this case. Instead of acting as separate 
agents and protecting an indirect and distant ‘nature,’ indigenous Amazonians conceive of 
themselves as part of a larger ecological assemblage from which they cannot detach themselves. 
In this way, ecological protection can be directly linked to human experience and day to day life. 
Shamanic practices throughout Amazonia further demonstrate the interplay between humans and 
nonhuman actants. These practices point to a distributive agency in which plants act through and 
alongside humans in community healing performances.  
Plants, Shamanism, and Edible Matter 
 In Amazonia, medicinal knowledge is passed down over centuries through oral tradition. 
However, shamans still spend much of their lives studying the spiritual and physical properties 
of plants (Bussmann and Sharon 2006). The shamans, or ‘curanderos’ of southern Ecuador serve 
as spiritual leaders as well as healers and are believed to channel the healing properties of 
different medicinal plants (Beyer 2010). Because plants and animals are ascribed the status of 
persons, “they are believed to see themselves in human form and thought to be self-aware of their 
own personhood” (Beyer, 113). This point is important when studying plants as vital 
materialities in Amazonia, as plants are believed to quite literally speak to shamans, teaching 
them how to heal specific ailments. Like Bennett, shamans understand that edible matter can 
affect one’s habits and dispositions. However, they understand the vitality and efficacy of plants 
somewhat differently. While edible matter acts through humans, affecting their dispositions in 
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both the shamanic tradition and Bennett’s description, shamans understand this process as part of 
their education rather than through scientific processes. For Bennett, the vital materiality of 
nonhuman entities is not a “spiritual supplement or ‘life force’” (xiii). Instead, she equates 
“affect with materiality, rather than posit[ing] a separate force that can enter and animate a 
physical body” (xiii). I explore indigenous conceptions of the vital materiality of plants in terms 
of how the physical properties of plants couple with communal healing practices to create a 
specific ecological imaginary in Amazonia.  
 While Bennett draws on scientific studies of chemical compounds in plants that cause 
hallucinations, shamans believe plants possess a spiritual and communicative power that allows 
them to connect to other human and nonhuman things. Curanderos believe plants are teachers as 
their physical and spiritual properties work to heal and alter psychological states. For curanderos, 
plant knowledge is typically gained through a special diet consisting of the plants under study or 
through a spiritual process guided by ingesting plants with hallucinogenic properties such as 
ayahuasca. In this way, “to learn the plants, you do not just diet; you diet with a plant—that is, 
ingest the plant take it into your body, let it teach you from within while you keep loyal to it” 
(Beyer, 60). Curanderos recognize plants as possessing human-like qualities, and once ingested, 
plants are able to speak through them. This interaction becomes possible as curanderos are 
thought to be a medium through which plant knowledge is transferred, much like a dialogue 
takes place between persons. As Beyer (2010) points out, this tends to be an intimate process:   
The shaman ‘masters’ the plant by taking the plant inside the body, letting the plant teach 
its mysteries, giving the self over to the power of the plant. There is a complex reciprocal, 
interpersonal relationship between shaman and other-than-human person—fear, awe, 
passion, surrender, friendship, and love (61).  
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In this way, curanderos understand themselves as apprentices to the plants which they study 
(Beyer, 62). Where Bennett’s edible matter, such as the lipids in certain snack foods or omega-3 
fatty acids in fish, can cause external changes like weight gain or mental changes such as 
lowered propensity to violence, curandero practices indicate that plants not only physically act as 
agents within the body, but they also serve a more profound role as teachers for the health of the 
entire community (Beyer, 64). In this view, it is plants themselves who dictate how and why they 
are used in practice.   
 This viewpoint is in line with Bennett’s description of the ‘vital materiality’ of nonhuman 
things. For Bennett, nonhuman things ought to be understood as personified actors—as lively 
materialities that can “enliven or destroy, enrich or disable, ennoble or degrade us, [and] in any 
case, call for our attentiveness, or even respect” (ix). Shamans and indigenous Amazonians 
believe that nonhuman entities are very much alive and predicate their healing practices on this 
notion. Bennett’s goal of articulating the “vibrant materiality that runs alongside and inside 
humans to see how analyses of political events might change if we gave the force of things their 
due” is already taking shape throughout Amazonia (viii). Although Bennett wants us to 
recognize how we are affected by vibrant materialities in a non-spiritual, scientific sense, the 
mystical way in which Amazonians interpret vibrant materialities also creates public moods and 
dispositions that implicate political practices. Amazonians bring nonhumans into the political 
realm through different tools, instruments, and practices. For Amazonians, “giving the force of 
things their due” does not only mean studying their physical properties, but acknowledging them 
as equal agents and essential participants in community life.  
 Shamanic spiritual practices with plants involve healing rituals that are tied in with 
specific types of music and dance traditions. The ritual of ayahuasca is a common “thread linking 
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the religion and spirituality of almost all the indigenous peoples of the Upper Amazon” (Beyer, 
210). Usually ingested as a drink, ayahuasca is readily available in most parts of Amazonia. It is 
through the hallucinogenic power of the ayahuasca drink that “hundreds of healing plants, 
including the plants used for magical attack and defense, reveal their appearance and teach their 
songs” (210). Plant ‘songs’ are an important feature of this experience, with different varieties of 
plants believed to possess their own vibratory qualities, which are then performed by curanderos 
and their communities through song and dance (Beyer, 80).  
 Bennett points out that edible matter has long been recognized in European philosophical 
traditions as playing an important role in cultural practices that have shaped the “dispositions of 
persons and nations” (43). She quotes Nietzsche’s example of Bismark’s Germany to illustrate 
this point:  
 Nietzsche gestures toward the agency of the food-person-sound-nation assemblage in his 
discussion of anti-Semitism’s hold on Bismarck’s Germany: he names beer as a 
contributing source, but beer as part of a diet consisting also of German ‘newspapers, 
politics… and Wagnerian music’ (44-45).  
Nietzsche’s view of edible matter as part of a larger societal assemblage is very much inline with 
traditional curandero practices as they both involve much more than the ingestion of a specific 
substance. Instead, these types of assemblages implicate other cultural practices, which imbue 
certain edible materialities with agentic potentials they might not otherwise have. In the case of 
Bismark’s Germany, anti-Semitism was constructed not by one, but by many concurrent 
practices. Likewise, shamanic learning and healing does not take place in Amazonia merely by 
ingesting certain plants, but with the help of other social and cultural forces. Western science, 
however, tells us that hallucinogenic plants such as ayahuasca and even tobacco, do possess 
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chemical elements that can affect one’s disposition, habits, and health on their own. Therefore, it 
is not just the cultural and spiritual significance of plants that determine their public effects, but 
also the physical properties of the plants themselves.  
 In particular, chemists have found that ayahuasca contains the MAO-A inhibiter known 
as B-carboline, a chemical compound known for its hallucinogenic properties (Beyer, 209).  
Hallucinogenic compounds can alter one’s physical and mental state in such a way that 
disposition and mood are strongly affected. This is also true of tobacco, which is used as a 
healing plant in many cultures throughout the upper Amazon. Tobacco can be “smoked, snuffed, 
chewed, licked, or even made into a syrup” for recreational use and healing purposes (Beyer, 
269). In fact, “mapacho is a species of tobacco containing very high levels of nicotine and other 
psychoactive pyridine alkaloids—the highest nicotine levels of any tobacco species” in the world 
(Beyer, 268). Such high levels of nicotine have hallucinogenic properties and are used by 
shamans as learning tools and for healing practices. Although tobacco use has been proven to 
have negative consequences on health, there are studies that also suggest nicotine can help to 
“counteract the depression of performance produced by scopolamine on both rapid information 
and complex processing tasks” (Beyer, 269). Further, tobacco has been linked with improvement 
in “general psychopathology symptoms, poor attention, disorientation, [and] poor impulse 
control (Beyer, 269). 
 Although Bennett does not suggest that edible matter has efficacy through spiritual 
properties, it is clear that one’s perception of spiritual efficacy does have lasting political effects 
in indigenous Amazonian culture. Where science dictates the function and implications of 
chemical compounds within plants, it is also their spiritual significance, role as teachers, and 
accompanying communal practices that dictate their complete function in Amazonian society. 
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Moreover, although shamans are the only ones to receive plant knowledge, healing is very much 
a communal practice in Amazonia as everyone plays an active role in the health and well-being 
of others. This community-oriented practice of healing may not only intensify the physical 
effects of plants, but can also inform how indigenous Amazonians care for plants and other 
nonhuman entities as the groundwork for societal-level guardianship and responsibility to protect 
nonhuman entities is already established. Further, because plants are thought to be teachers, they 
are also community-level participants which directly links their welfare to the welfare of society. 
Although a thorough scientific understanding of plants is not needed to create the indigenous 
ecological imaginary, science does play an important role in Latour’s ‘parliament of things.’ 
Below, I compare ‘matters of concern’ to Amazonian species classification schemes.     
Species Classification and Matters of Concern  
 Latour proposes that nonhuman entities should be brought into collective life through 
their designation as ‘matters of concern,’ that provoke a lively controversy. He suggests that 
nonhuman entities engage with and affect humans through a process of collective 
experimentation. In this process, scientists collaborate in politics—it is scientists who consult 
with nonhuman entities, using their expertise to define the problems that matters of concern pose 
for the collective—and it is in their role as spokespersons that they collaborate with politicians 
through contestation and parliamentary debate. In this process, nonhuman entities become 
participants in collective life, and we become aware of their agency and relationship to humans. 
While Amazonians classify nonhuman entities in terms of their importance for humans and 
problems they raise for collective life, they do not employ the collective experimentation process 
Latour envisions. As discussed in the previous section, lines of kinship and healing practices in 
Amazonia reveal a relational understanding of the ways in which humans and nonhumans 
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interact. Although species classification systems also involve an understating of the affective 
relationships between humans and nonhumans, these relationships are not studied by designated 
experts and negotiated through spokespersons as described by Latour. I explore here how this 
relational understanding couples with indigenous knowledge of the physical properties of plants 
and animals, exhibiting some facets of Latour’s matters of concern, while rendering others, such 
as well-defined experts and spokespersons, obsolete. This analysis will be important for 
determining the political implications of post-humanist ecologies as they move from the domain 
of indigenous beliefs and practices to western-centered legal frameworks in the next chapter.  
 Indigenous Amazonians do not classify plants and animals in terms of genetic factors as 
with scientific species classification schemes, but rather by their morphology and relationship to 
humans, in a process William Balée (2003) refers to as ‘overdifferentiation.’ For example, the 
domestic tuber crop, known as manioc, is identified as only one species scientifically, but “is 
typically subdivided into between 15 and 137 different folk species in Amazonian cultures… the 
average being 22 per native language” (Balée, 278). Moreover, the Achuar people of the Andes 
region recognize 12 “folk species of felines, but fewer than half of these folk species are 
distinguished as separate taxa in systematic zoology” (Balée, 278). The physical properties and 
effects of plants often dictate their specific relationship to humans and how they are brought into 
decision-making processes, typically through traditional knowledge and observation. In this case, 
‘overdifferentiation’ can be interpreted as the result of consultation processes between human 
and nonhuman entities.  
 The physical properties of plants are often based in differences of appearance and gender. 
Leaf shape, texture and bloom color can all work to determine whether a plant is classified as 
male or female and dictates how it should be used in practice (Balée 2003). Plants that are 
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classified by western science as the same species are named and used differently in medicinal 
and dietary practice in Amazonia (Beyer 2009, 307). Beyer helps to explain several of these 
applications: 
 Toé negro and toé blanco, white and black toé, are considered by botanists to be in 
 completely different genera, but are conceptually linked through their uses and effects; 
 ishanga blanca and ishanga roja, white and red ishanga, in different genera but both with 
 stinging hairs used to treat snakebite; or verbena blanca and verbena negra, in different 
 genera, but both considered to be cold plants to treat hot conditions such as fever and 
 diarrhea (312).  
It is through direct observation of the physical characteristics of plants and their consequent 
effects on the body that they come to be classified in Amazonia. This relational understanding is 
similar to Bennett and Deleuze’s description of “affective bodies” as it is through their outward 
effects that plants are classified. However, it is different than the scientific process described by 
Latour in which nonhumans are a subject of perplexity and consulted with during a collective 
experimentation process. Instead, plants enter into collective life through generational knowledge 
in which many community members take part. Consultation does not happen in laboratories and 
there are no ‘scientific’ instruments and procedures that help inform how humans are to speak on 
behalf of nonhuman entities. Amazonia is unique in this way, as community members live in 
close connection with and proximity to nonhuman entities. In western society, there is a 
bifurcation between humans and nonhumans and assemblages between entities are not 
automatically apparent. That is, facts occur in laboratories and values in the political realm in 
western society, with no culturally embedded understanding of direct affective relationships 
between humans and nonhumans. However, in Amazonia, there is a deep communal knowledge 
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of affective relationships stemming from direct observation and communal necessity. The 
classification of bees by the Kayapó people provides insight into this relational and generational 
type of knowledge.  
 The Kayapó people of Amazonia recognize over 56 different folk species of bees, of 
which 11 “were found to be either unknown or new to science” (Balée, 279). Bees are very 
important to the Kayopó way of life as their wax is used “to caulk boats, coat cotton string and 
cord, to make numerous ceremonial objects, and are burned to produce smoke that repels insects, 
exorcise evil spirits, and cure illnesses” (Posey 1983, 155). Bees are classified depending on 
their functional context, nest structure, location, behavior, sting, and quality of the honey they 
produce:  
 One functional classification system is based on the aggressive behavior of bees when 
 disturbed. There are four major divisions of behavior in this system: docile, stinging, 
 biting, and blister-causing. Another functional taxonomic system is based on honey-
 related variables: taste, acidity, quantity found in one nest, and time of the year the nest 
 can be raided... The Kayapó recognize eight ecological zones and associate certain 
 species of bees with each zone. Nests are grouped by: nest site (in a tree, in the earth, in 
 vines, in abandoned termite hills, etc.); the height of the nest from the ground; the shape 
 and size of the entrance tube (length, shape, markings, size, etc.); and nest size (based 
 on gross size, relative amount of honey per nest, etc. (Posey, 156).   
In this way, it is because bees relate to one’s livelihood, tools and even diet, that they come to be 
a matter of concern for the Kayopó.  
 It is imperative that the Kayopó classify bees by their behavior, nest structure, and 
location, as these characteristics often dictate how humans identify useful and potentially 
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harmful bees in the wild. This overdifferentiation of bees is corresponds with Latour’s 
description of matters of concern inasmuch as the Kayopó prioritize them based on their degree 
of harm and importance for people. Bee classification schemes are not arbitrary means of 
differentiation, but rather logical and practical tools for safely extracting honey and wax. Posey 
(1983) helps to clarify this point:   
 Nests are raided using strategies consistent with the aggressive nature of the species. For 
 the most violent (akre), fire and smoke are used to expel the colony before the nest is 
 opened. If the nest is high up in a tree, the entire tree will be felled in order to get to the 
 nest. For less aggressive species (wajobare), the Indians tackle the nest with axes and 
 bare hands despite clouds of furious, swarming insects (156).  
Certainly, not every insect in Amazonia is classified according to these same rules as different 
relationships between nonhuman plants, animals, insects, and humans require their own set of 
guidelines. Bee classification schemes provide a way of prioritizing, labeling and bringing bees 
into collective life, but there is no apparent necessity within Amazonian communities to delegate 
scientists and spokespersons to collaborate with political decision-makers as classification of 
nonhumans has become a procedure tasked to entire communities over generations. In this way, 
there are no designated bee experts, but cultural practices that implicate many community 
members in the consultation process.  
 The classification practices of nonhuman entities in Amazonia fits in well with the post-
humanist concepts of assemblage and affective bodies, where humans and nonhumans interact in 
the everyday lives of Amazonians. In the indigenous context, ‘nature’ is not bifurcated between 
humans and nonhumans and matters of concern do not present themselves through a collective 
experimentation process. Instead, nonhuman entities are already inherently tied-in with 
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indigenous practices, beliefs, and community life. It is when nonhuman entities must be 
addressed by wider society—where they are not already recognized as participants in community 
life—that matters of concern appear necessitate spokespersons and scientific processes. While 
the Maori do not completely adhere to Latour’s collective experimentation process either, their 
assessment of ecosystem health does appear to be more inline with its main tenets.  
Maori Beliefs and Practices 
 The Maori people of New Zealand share a similar ecological imaginary to indigenous 
peoples throughout Ecuador and Bolivia. For the Maori, humans and nonhuman plants, animals, 
and things are all thought to be essential parts of an overall ecosystem (TeAhukaramū 2007). 
Below, I compare the Maori understanding of ecosystems to an assemblage, unpacking the 
notion of ‘whakapapa’ involved in Maori burial practices and ‘kaitiakitanga’ as it informs 
sustainable land and resource management. Next, I analyze the Maori assessment of ecosystem 
health in light of Latour’s matters of concern and collective experimentation process as it 
exemplifies how cultural practices can merge with scientific experimentation to reveal a new 
conception of agency. Maori beliefs not only indicate a conception of ‘nature’ that is different 
from western practices, I argue, but they also reflect several of the potential benefits of post-
humanist ecology as outlined by Bennett and Latour.  
Ecosystems and Assemblages  
 To unpack the Maori interpretation of ecosystems, it is necessary to understand the 
significance of the terms ‘whakapapa’ and ‘kaitiakitanga.’ According to Harmsworth and 
Awatere (2013), whakapapa is a “connection, lineage, or genealogy” between humans and 
nonhumans, including “all flora and fauna” (275). For the Maori, everything within the natural 
environment is thought to be connected to everything else, “in an intricate web of cause and 
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effect,” indicating a relational understanding of human and nonhuman entities (Harmsworth and 
Awatere 2013, 275). Kaitiakitanga is tied-in with whakapapa and is often interpreted as a form of 
‘guardianship’ or duty to maintain a balance between all things within an ecosystem 
(Harmsworth and Awatere 2013; Kawharu 2000; TeAhukaramū 2007). Bennett, recall, argues 
that an ethical imperative of guardianship is one of the potential benefits of post-humanist 
ecology. It is because the Maori first acknowledge a common thread linking humans and 
nonhumans in whakapapa that they engage in the guardianship of nonhuman entities in terms of 
kaitiakitanga. In this way, guardianship is predicated on the notion that ecosystems require the 
protection of all their various parts—both human and nonhuman—if they are to function 
properly.  
 Because whakapapa involves all known entities including “plants, animals, birds, fish, 
microorganisms, the genes they contain, and the larger ecosystems they form,” the Maori are 
careful not to disrupt what they consider to be a natural balance within their environment. 
(Harmsworth and Awatere 2013, 277). Maori burial practices provide a good example of how the 
Maori endeavor to maintain this natural balance. Often, the burial of a Maori individual takes 
place closest to where he or she lived, not due to familial proximity, but because the proximity of 
that person to the ecosystem from which they were part (Kawharu 2000). For the Maori, the 
body must return to and give back to the land that sustained it throughout its life. Ancestral lines 
connect humans as well as nonhumans because the human body is inextricable from its 
environment.  
 The belief of an interconnection between humans and nonhumans within an ecosystem 
informs how landmarks are named according to their connection with the Maori people. That is, 
human names are attributed to specific landmarks, indicating where Maori ancestors lived, died, 
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and were most connected to the land. Merata Kawharu (2000) points out some of the most 
notable titles:  
 Te Paneohoroiwi 'The Head of Horoiwi', refers to the eastern headland by the Tamaki 
 River and so named by Horoiwi, an ancestor of the Tainui tribe. Orakei, otherwise known 
 as Orakeiiriora, is 'The Place of Rakeiiriora'; Rakeiiriora was a leader from the Tokomaru 
 canoe who lived in Tamaki for some time (364).   
Burial practices and the naming of landmarks in Maori culture points to a deep understanding of 
the ways in which humans and nonhumans interact with and affect one another when 
participating in an ecosystem. The practice of naming landmarks after Maori ancestors is 
symbolic of the ways in which the Maori live off the land and interact with natural processes 
while striving to maintain a symbiotic relationship between humans and ‘nature.’  
 The conception of symbiotic human and nonhuman associations is demonstrated in the 
Maori practices of kaitiakitanga. Although kaitiakitanga translates as ‘guardianship’ it can also 
be interpreted to mean a way of living in accordance with whakapapa (TeAhukaramū 2007). 
Guardianship in this sense refers to customary practices that involve resource management. 
Charles TeAhukaramū (2007) outlines several of these practices:  
 Kaitiakitanga [involves] temporary bans (rāhui) on taking food from an area, using the 
 lunar calendar (maramataka) to decide when to plant and harvest, taking resources only 
 as needed, hunting and fishing only for food (not as sport), using bird snares at the right 
 time [and] not when the birds are breeding (2).   
The Maori have been practicing kaitiakitanga customary ways of life for centuries, treating 
natural resources as vital components of a larger web of life. In fact, as their burial practices 
indicate, the Maori believe that natural resources—whether animals, plants, or inorganic 
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materials—represent traces of their ancestry in the same way that living humans do 
(TeAhukaramū 2007). Thus, people are not conceived as “superior to the natural order” but are 
part of a “nexus that permeates all spiritual and environmental spheres” (Merata 2000, 351). For 
the Maori, resource management is not just a means for sustaining human survival, but a way to 
preserve the historical link tracing back to their first ancestors. As human and nonhuman matter 
decomposes in the soil and generates new life, it recycles back into the ecosystem in a cyclical 
process of rebirth (Merata 2000). All vital materiality thus becomes part of one ancestral lineage.  
 The belief in whakapapa and practice of kaitiakitanga indicate that the Maori people 
understand affective relationships between humans and nonhumans and that each vital 
materiality is essential to an ecosystem’s functioning. Envisaging linkages between humans and 
nonhumans is important as it can potentially change the way nonhuman agency is perceived and 
how humans produce political effects. Kaitiakitanga and whakapapa both emphasize not only the 
vital materiality of nonhumans when engaged in an ecosystem, but they also challenge the 
hierarchy of power and agency that places human action as the sole producer of effects. This 
viewpoint is much different than the western conception of nonhuman entities and ‘nature,’ 
where humans are dominant actors, presiding over nature rather than actively participating 
within it. When humans are conceived as inextricable from their environment, and vital 
materialities as essential actants in their symbiosis with humans, it becomes necessary and 
rational to protect the well-being of ‘nature.’ In this way, conceptions of the agency of 
nonhuman entities and recognition of human and nonhuman assemblages provide the 
groundwork to cement ecologically-minded policies into legal and political discourse.   
 Maori beliefs and practices exemplify in several respects what Bennett sees as the virtue 
of post-humanist ecology. For example, the micropractices of kaitiakitanga reduce the impact of 
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human action “so as to minimize the damage or destruction of other things which [they] share 
existence” (Bennett 2010, 121).  Further, anthropomorphism is present in the Maori worldview 
as people are not named after ‘natural’ landmarks, but vice versa. Again, Bennett does not 
disregard anthropocentrism, but sees it as a means by which humans can come to know and 
relate to nonhuman entities. Analogies between humans and nonhumans are important to a post-
humanist project, as human-centered identifications of nonhumans can reveal linkages between 
humans and ‘nature.’ The Maori conception of ecosystems not only gives nonhuman entities 
their due, but “reshapes the self and its interests” to create a more ecologically-minded politics 
(Bennett 2010, 122). Moreover, these community level cultural practices and dispositions help 
ensure the preservation of ecosystems through everyday actions and can add up to generate a 
societal public mood of ecological awareness. It is in this societal awareness that Bennett 
envisions a new, more ecologically-conscious political discourse emerging. Public moods 
implicate other societal practices as well. In the next section I explore the Maori concept of 
‘mauri’ and how it has merged with western scientific practices measuring ecosystem health in a 
process similar to Latour’s collective experimentation. 
Ecosystem Health and Matters of Concern 
 There is no bifurcation of nature in Maori society, so the inclusion of cultural values in 
the assessment of ecosystem health comes as no surprise. Maori ecosystem health indicators are 
a mix of scientific data collection and cultural awareness of what the Maori believe is ‘mauri’—
or life energy, that is exchanged between entities. Merging the cultural belief of mauri with 
western scientific practices exemplifies how an understanding of assemblage and the vital 
materiality of nonhumans can be worked into a societal level framework for addressing matters 
of concern. The ultimate goal of Latour’s collective experimentation process is not to attribute 
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responsibility to any one actant, but to reveal the process by which an emergent totality forms, 
uncovering the agency of nonhuman actants along the way. Below, I discuss how the Maori use a 
Cultural Health Index to address matters of concern in a process similar to Latour’s collective 
experimentation. 
 Mauri entails that all humans and nonhumans are spiritually connected, and implicates 
the way in which the Maori assess ecosystem health. Harmsworth and Awatere (2013) provide a 
detailed definition of mauri: 
 Mauri [is] an internal energy or life force derived from whakapapa, an essential essence 
 or element sustaining all forms of life. Mauri provides life and energy to all living things, 
 and is the binding force that links the physical to the spiritual worlds. It denotes a health 
 and spirit, which permeates through all living and non-living things. All plants, animals, 
 water and soil possess mauri. Damage or contamination to the environment is therefore 
 damage to or loss of mauri (276).   
For the Maori, the life force of every entity is linked to the life force of every other entity and 
“small shifts in the mauri of any part of the environment” can cause shifts in the health of 
“immediately related components which could eventually affect the whole system” (Harmsworth 
et al. 2011, 424). Thus, when a problem arises for the Maori community, such as algae blooms in 
waterways, soil degradation, disease, or natural disaster, they view the problem as impacting the 
entire ecosystem and do not make a clear distinction between nonhuman actants and human 
actors.  
 In 1999, the Maori developed the Cultural Health Index (CHI), a “tool to express their 
cultural values relating to river and stream health and customary resources in a way that could be 
incorporated into catchment management decisions” (Harmsworth and Awatere 2013, 276). The 
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CHI is an environmental health assessment strategy, incorporating a scientific understanding of 
flora, fauna, and water quality as well as cultural estimates of the condition of heritage sites and 
mauri. Consequently, Maori values and knowledge are incorporated along with western models 
of ecosystem health and sustainability (Harmsworth and Awatere 2013, 277). The CHI provides 
a way to address matters of concern that affect the Maori way of life while reconciling western 
science with cultural attitudes and beliefs.  
 According to Latour, matters of concern ought to be assessed through expert level 
knowledge as it relates to cultural values. In this way, human needs and interventions merge with 
the activities of nonhuman forces to generate a thorough understanding of events. Thus, agency 
is not attributed solely to human actors, but couples with nonhuman forces to emerge as a 
totality. Bennett points out that it can be difficult to attribute responsibility to any one actant, 
especially when unintended events occur such as the North American blackout as discussed in 
chapter one (2010, 26-27). Bennett borrows Latour’s description of causality, for whom “there is 
no object, no subject…but there are events” as we are always “slightly surprised by what [we] 
do” (27). The CHI effectively merges scientific assessment with Maori beliefs, indicating that 
cultural attitudes play a role in shaping how we address ecological issues.  
 For the Maori, the health of one entity within an ecosystem affects all other entities. 
While the traditional belief in mauri contributes to a nexus understanding of matters of concern 
and ecosystem health, it is also through aesthetic, artistic, educational, and scientific channels 
that ecosystems are valued and come to be protected in Maori society (Harvey 2006). That is, 
every sector of society combines to create a cultural disposition that guides decision-making 
regarding matters of concern such as water pollution and forest degradation. The Maori 
interpretation of ecosystems and measurement of ecosystem health is not predicated on human 
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use-values. While western conceptions of ‘nature’ are often centered around the accumulation of 
and dominance over nonhuman entities, the Maori have fostered a way of life that rejects human 
superiority in favor of an ecosystem approach that includes the human as an actor, but not the 
only, or most important actor. Because nonhuman entities are viewed as crucial participants in 
ecosystem health and ecosystems are perceived as a totality rather than individually-organized 
parts, the conservation of all nonhuman entities become a matter of both cultural significance 
and common-sense practice.  
 There is a transformation taking place at the point where indigenous Maori values enter 
into western scientific practices, decision-making, and legal frameworks of action. On the one 
hand, Maori beliefs and practices run contrary to western practices of human superiority, 
instrumentality and accumulation. On the other hand, the Maori must adhere to western science 
and legal frameworks of action to address ecosystem concerns at the state level. We can already 
begin to see the virtues of post-humanist ecologies as they play out within indigenous 
Amazonian and Maori cultures. In the next chapter, I discuss how these attitudes and aesthetic-
affective styles about nonhuman entities and ‘nature’ translate into rights of nature laws.  
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CHAPTER IV: RIGHTS OF NATURE LAW IN ECUADOR, BOLIVIA, AND NEW 
ZEALAND 
In chapter three, I established a link between indigenous beliefs and practices in 
Amazonia and New Zealand and the post-humanist ecologies of Jane Bennett and Bruno Latour. 
These linkages will be helpful for determining the import of indigenous worldviews in rights of 
nature law, revealing several of the political implications of post-humanist ecology in terms of 
how cultural attitudes can inform legal and political discourse. Specifically, I hope to answer the 
following questions: Do rights of nature laws reflect indigenous beliefs and practices and serve 
the kinds of politics that Bennett and Latour advocate, following from a post-humanist 
perspective? How do rights of nature laws promote Latour’s ‘parliament of things’ and what do 
they tell us about how collective experimentation might work? And finally, what new cultural 
styles and public moods might rights of nature laws instill in broader society in light of what 
Bennett sees as the virtues of post-humanist ecology? To answer these questions, I explore rights 
of nature laws in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand in terms of the content of the legal 
frameworks and their implementation and enforcement mechanisms.  
Rights of Nature in Ecuador  
There is a large indigenous population in Ecuador with 7 percent being fully Amerindian 
and 72 percent being mestizo, with a mix of white and Amerindian ancestry (CIA Factbook 
2017). With such an overwhelming portion of the population being of indigenous decent, it is not 
surprising that Ecuador has become a plurinational polity, in which a growing number of 
indigenous groups have gained representation in government. In fact, Ecuador’s current 
president, Rafael Correa, is of indigenous Andean ancestry. Correa came to power in 2006, 
running his campaign on constitutional reform and promoting new ways of development counter 
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to western practices of resource exploitation (Burbach 2007). The election of Correa, coupled 
with decades of previous environmental movements led by indigenous groups and regional 
activists, laid the groundwork for establishing a new Ecuadorian constitution in 2008. Akchurin 
(2015) proposes that the idea of rights of nature grew out of the “schematic connection between 
plurinationality, collective rights, and an opening of the mind on subjects related to nature, 
combined with the political influence of the indigenous movement in the assembly process” 
(954). This opening up of the political realm to indigenous peoples and rights of nature advocates 
created a space for alternative views of ‘nature’ to be incorporated in the new constitution. 
Environmental activists, politicians, and indigenous representatives worked together to draft the 
new constitution which combined “radical western ecological perspectives, politicized 
indigenous beliefs, and legal rights discourse” to construct a “hybrid concept that imagined and 
codified nature as a subject of constitutional rights” (Akchurin 2015, 960). I analyze the 2008 
Ecuadorian constitution below in terms of its inclusion of indigenous beliefs and practices and its 
implementation and enforcement mechanisms to get to the heart of how post-humanist ecologies 
can work in practice, and what implications they might have for wider society.   
Constitution of Ecuador 
There is no doubt that the 2008 constitution reflects indigenous Amazonian conceptions 
regarding nonhuman entities and ‘nature.’ Several of the initial reports that informed the drafting 
of the new constitution laid out the need to incorporate indigenous beliefs and practices into legal 
frameworks with the intent to change the development paradigm. Indeed, there was a conscious 
effort by the drafters to “palliate the unforeseeable consequences that [would] result if Ecuador 
[were to continue] with its model of development and anthropocentric approach to the 
environment” (Akchurin 2015, 959). The text of the constitution reflects indigenous Amazonian 
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conceptions of ‘nature’ in terms of recognizing nonhuman entities as persons and incorporating 
an assemblage-like understanding of the interconnection between human and nonhuman entities.  
The opening line of Chapter I of the constitution states that “persons and people have the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in this Constitution and in the international human rights 
instruments” and “nature is subject to those rights given by this constitution and law.” Further, 
nature is referred to in the document as ‘Pachamama,’ which is an indigenous Amazonian term 
for Mother Earth. Chapter VII of the constitution lays out the rights of Pachamama, including its 
right to the “integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life 
cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes” (Article 71). While the document does 
not go into great detail regarding the protection of specific nonhuman entities, it is radical in that 
it encompasses all entities. As explained in the previous chapter, nonhuman entities are an 
integral part of Amazonian communal life and Amazonians do not strictly distinguish between 
human and nonhuman bodily forms. Although the text of the constitution does not directly 
reflect these beliefs, it does call for the protection of indigenous “ancestral wisdom…and 
traditional practices…with the right to restore, promote, and protect ritual holy places, as well as 
plants, animals, minerals and ecosystems” (Chapter IV, Article 57.12). We know from chapter 
three that the Amazonian relational understanding between human and nonhuman entities 
encourages guardianship and protection of nonhuman entities. What the constitution leaves out, 
however, is strong language affirming the vitality of ‘nature’ in itself and the significant function 
of nonhuman entities in Amazonian culture.  
The constitution is also vague in terms of who is to speak on behalf of ‘nature,’ stating 
only that “all persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to 
enforce the rights of nature” (Chapter VII, Article 71). Whereas Latour envisions a parliament 
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that enlists spokespersons from different domains to speak for nonhuman entities in the political 
realm, Ecuador’s constitution does not outline a specific procedural method by which ecological 
concerns can be measured and brought into politics. However, this has not stopped Ecuadorian 
citizens from appealing to rights of nature law and speaking on behalf of nonhuman entities. 
Assessing how rights of nature are implemented and enforced in practice will give us a better 
understanding of the law’s strengths and shortcomings.  
Implementation and Enforcement  
 So far, there have been ten court cases that have ruled in favor of the rights of nature as 
established in the Ecuadorian constitution (Kauffman and Martin 2016). The first successful case 
(Wheeler c. Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja) was heard in 2011 by the 
Provincial Court of Justice in Loja, Ecuador in which the court upheld the right of the 
Vilcabamba River to maintain its vital lifecycle (Daly 2012; Colón-Ríos 2015). The case was 
brought by Nori Huddle and Richard Fredrick Wheeler, two landowners who represented the 
Vilcabamba River in court. Huddle and Wheeler argued that during a city road construction 
project, debris was dumped into the river, disrupting its natural flow which flooded several of its 
tributaries, and threatened flora and fauna in the region.  
 There two noteworthy outcomes that stemmed from this court case. First, the court ruled 
that the burden to show damage and gather scientific data is on the defendant, in this case, the 
city government of Loja. Second, the court made it clear that the landowners did not have to 
prove they were affected by the city’s negligence, but only that actions by the city caused 
damage to the river’s ecosystem itself (Kauffman and Martin 2016). The city government of 
Loja failed to conduct an environmental impact assessment before construction and did not 
properly consult with conservation specialists. Indeed, Latour stresses the importance of 
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consultation with scientists, who can adequately understand matters of concern from the 
perspective of nonhuman entities when we bring them into our politics. While this crucial step 
was ignored by the city government, the court’s decision that the river is a rights bearing entity in 
itself, solidified the rights of nature, setting precedent for future court cases. Nonetheless, 
winning the court case proved to be only half the battle as the lack of a proper enforcement 
mechanism undermined the ruling. 
 Although the Loja city government wrote a public apology in a local newspaper and 
partially cleaned up the debris, they stopped short of rehabilitating the Vilcabamba River 
ecosystem as ordered in the ruling. Erin Daly (2012) underscores the troubling lack of 
enforcement for upholding the rights of nature in practice:  
 Even though the right has been judicially vindicated, supporters of the plaintiffs have 
 been compelled to hire lawyers to pursue enforcement. Unfortunately, it seems that in 
 many lawsuits seeking to vindicate environmental rights, it is as difficult to secure 
 enforcement of remedial orders as it is to obtain the judicial victory in the first place (63). 
  While it is difficult to determine if the ruling would achieve greater enforcement had the 
environmental impact been directly linked to an infringement on human-centered rights, there 
are indications that appealing to rights of nature can transform the way the judicial system 
interprets the vitality of ecosystems.  
 Since the drafting of Ecuador’s new constitution in 2008, two closed court cases 
involving mining operations were re-opened and newly assessed in light of the rights of nature 
(Kauffman and Martin 2016). This tells us that there is an effort within Ecuadorian society to 
view environmental issues from the perspective of nonhuman entities, and to consider how the 
vitality of nature itself has been left out of previous discussions involving ecological 
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conservation. While the reopened mining cases have yet to overturn previous rulings, they signal 
a shift in the way environmental issues are perceived by the courts, possibly lending more 
credibility to the rights of nature in the future. Continued appeal to the rights of nature will only 
strengthen debate about the vitality of nonhuman entities, and can perhaps create a space for 
normative shifts in the way ‘nature’ is generally perceived. Maria Akchurin (2015) remains 
hopeful that this is the case: 
 This story was not only an instance of an alternative philosophy becoming incorporated 
into a legal framework, but also an important case of how indigenous politics influenced 
nonindigenous systems of authority and created the space for a different understanding of 
nature/society relations to be conceptualized, described, and incorporated into the 
constitution, pushing the boundaries of existing ideas about rights, authority, and the 
state. This process also allowed for the legal materialization of broader ontological 
debates about the status of nature (960).  
At this point, appealing to the rights of nature in Ecuador is at a preliminary and reactionary 
stage. Yet, as Bennett points out, there is hope for a new ecologically-minded politics that can 
evolve out of the understanding of nonhuman entities as vital materialities. When we shift our 
attention away from the old language of environmental management to new ideas about how 
humans are situated among various nonhuman actants, we can inform new ecological practices 
that are proactive from the start. For now, rights of nature laws in Ecuador seem to be laying the 
groundwork for a cultural shift in the way humans perceive the vitality of nonhumans in 
themselves.  
 Meanwhile, the Ecuadorian court case affirms the necessity to enlist spokespersons who 
consult with and speak on behalf of nonhuman entities. Relying on defendants to conduct their 
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own environmental impact assessments is certainly not a viable means for ensuring an unbiased 
account of what is in the nonhuman’s interest. For Latour, it is not just a question of whether we 
bring nonhuman entities into our politics, but how we can do it effectively. That is, rights of 
nature laws allow for the legal status of nonhuman entities, but it is important to understand the 
channels by which we come to know what issues they raise for collective life. With luck, 
collective experimentation will work itself into the political and legal system as cultural attitudes 
and perspectives regarding the status of nonhuman entities as vital materialities continue to 
change. 
Rights of Nature in Bolivia 
 Indigenous peoples of Bolivia played an instrumental role in securing the rights of nature 
at the national level in 2010, following a similar path as indigenous Ecuadorians. In 2001, 
indigenous peoples gained recognition as a constituency within the now Plurinational Bolivian 
government, using their political voice to “openly challenge Eurocentric values in favor of 
nonmaterialist relationships with nature” (Hicks and Fabricant 2016, 93). In 2005, Bolivia 
elected Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of South America, who promised to 
challenge the neo-liberal development paradigm and embrace indigenous worldviews to help 
combat climate change (Hicks and Fabricant 2016). Indigenous beliefs about ‘nature’ began to 
take center stage in climate negotiations throughout Bolivia, culminating in the 2010 World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change (WPCCC) held in Tiquipaya. The WPCCC was a 
pivotal moment in Bolivia’s move towards adopting the rights of nature. The WPCCC brought 
together government representatives, indigenous and social groups, and environmental activists 
to develop the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth (UDRME), a new model of 
development which later informed the Bolivian Law on the Rights of Mother Earth.  
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 The UDRME was drafted as a preemptory norm to direct “sustainable development away 
from the discourse of [the] green economy and to align it with rights of nature discussions” 
(Espinosa 2014, 410). With a focus on the interdependence between society and ‘nature,’ the 
UDRME was intended to disclose the “intimate and inextricable connections among humans, 
other species, ecosystems, and the planet we inhabit together” (Sheehan 2012; Espinosa 2014, 
399). Accordingly, the UDRME underpins “the claim that humans are not apart from nature” and 
that “the organic and inorganic components of planet Earth have evolved together as a single 
living, self-regulating system” (Espinosa 2014, 399). The political goal of the UDRME to change 
the sustainable development paradigm resembles what Bennett sees as the virtue of her vital 
materialist project. Bennett asks: “Would a discursive shift from environmentalism to vital 
materialism enhance the prospects for a more sustainably-oriented public?” (111). Her 
comparison between environmentalism and vital materialism gets to the heart of this shift:  
 It is difficult… for a public convened by environmentalism to include animals, 
 vegetables, or minerals as bona fide members, for nonhumans are already named as a 
 passive environment or perhaps a recalcitrant context for human action. A more 
 materialist pubic would need to include more earthlings in the swarm of actants. If 
 environmentalists are selves who live on earth, vital materialists are selves who live as 
 earth… If environmentalism leads to the call for the protection and wise management of 
 an ecosystem that surrounds us, a vital materialism suggests that the task is to engage 
 more strategically with a trenchant materiality that is us as it vies with us in agentic 
 assemblages (2010, 111).  
There are strong similarities between a vital materialism which aims to reveal nonhuman agency 
and networks within assemblages and the UDRME which seeks to highlight the interdependence 
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between humans, nonhumans, and Earth’s systems. Not only do they both challenge western 
norms concerning the hierarchy of living beings and ‘nature,’ but they also offer an alternative 
approach, rooted in the notion that if we change our perspective of humanity as situated within 
‘nature,’ then sustainable ecological practices will follow. Bolivia’s Law on the Rights of Mother 
Earth follows the main tenets of the UDRME and further reflects the virtues of post-humanist 
ecology as described by Bennett and Latour.  
Bolivian Law on the Rights of Mother Earth 
 The Law on the Rights of Mother Earth highlights the importance of ‘nature’ in 
indigenous practices as well as the significant role that different culture plays in realizing the 
rights of nature. As discussed in chapter three, ecological protection of ‘nature’ seems to flow 
logically from the vital role that nonhuman entities, such as plants and bees, play in communal 
rituals and Amazonian ways of life. Moreover, affective relationships between humans and 
nonhumans tend to dictate Amazonian cultural practices and are inherently tied in with identity 
formation. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the Law on the Rights of Mother Earth 
specifies that “the exercise of individual rights is limited by the exercise of collective rights in 
the living systems of Mother Earth” (Chapter II, Article 6). This is a radical statement as it is 
most often human rights that take center stage in legal discourse. Yet, when we consider this 
from the lens of post-humanist ecology, we can see that individual rights are contingent upon the 
activity of other human and nonhuman actants in an assemblage. Indigenous beliefs and post-
humanist conceptions about the horizontal nature of agency make practical sense when 
considering how we might live sustainably as a collective. It is only when nonhuman entities are 
taken seriously as vital agents in collective life that we can ensure the long-term fulfillment of 
human rights. For example, the preservation of lakes and rivers can help ensure long-term human 
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access to fish stocks and promote financial security in fishing-based economies. It follows that 
human and nonhuman rights ought to be mutually exclusive. While this is a radical concept in 
terms of western views regarding individual rights, there is room in Bolivia’s law to include 
western practices in the realization of the rights of nature.  
 As also discussed in chapter three, Amazonians do not rely on western science to 
understand nonhuman entities as vital materialities and to debate matters of concern. However, 
the law recognizes both indigenous practices and western science as key requirements for 
exercising the rights of nature:  
 The exercise of the rights of Mother Earth requires the recognition, recovery, respect, 
 protection, and dialogue of the diversity of feelings, values, knowledge, skills, practices, 
 transcendence, transformation, science, technology and standards, of all the 
 cultures of the world (Chapter I, Article 2.6). 
While indigenous Amazonian worldviews were key in the drafting of the law, its text reveals the 
importance of merging indigenous beliefs with modern scientific practices for the rights of 
nature to be successful.  
 It is when indigenous practices and beliefs move from the domain of culture to western-
centered legal frameworks that they more readily align with Latour’s ‘parliament of things.’ The 
Law on the Rights of Mother Earth is grounded in the notion that there should be no bifurcation 
between facts and values. Combining indigenous beliefs regarding the interconnection between 
humans and nonhumans with modern scientific practices exemplifies a crucial step in Latour’s 
framework for including nonhumans in collective life. For Latour, we must not only understand 
how nonhuman actants function and affect us, but we must also decide their relative importance 
in different areas of our collective life. To do this, we must not “homogenize the voices” of all 
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stakeholders involved (Latour 2004, 113). While the law encompasses all entities within ‘nature’ 
as part of the “collective public interest,” it also states that we must “take into account the 
specificities and particularities of its various components” (Chapter II, Article 5). Although the 
law does not go into detail regarding how we might piece apart and understand entities within 
‘nature,’ Latour’s collective experimentation process provides some insight.  
 Latour lists four requirements for bringing nonhuman entities into public life as matters 
of concern: 1) they must be a subject of perplexity, 2) they must be properly consulted with and 
represented by relevant spokespersons, 3) they must be ranked according to their significance for 
society, and 4) we must adopt institutionalized measures to ensure they are properly addressed 
(2004, 111). The Law on the Rights of Nature touches on these four requirements. While not all 
nonhuman entities are an issue of immediate perplexity, the granting of broad legal rights to 
‘nature’ as a whole is symbolic of the interconnections between all entities—connections that 
must be understood if we are to properly address ecological problems. From this perspective, all 
entities are important to collective life and must be legally protected. What is less clear in the 
law, as with Ecuador’s constitution, is how nonhuman entities are to be represented through a 
democratic consultation process.   
Implementation and Enforcement 
 While all Bolivians are called on to implement and enforce the rights of nature in 
practice, the law acknowledges the need for a special representative to speak on behalf of 
‘nature.’ Article 10 of the law calls for the creation of the Defensoría de la Madre Tierra—the 
Office of the Mother Earth Ombudsman—whose “mission is to ensure the validity, promotion, 
distribution and compliance of the rights of Mother Earth” as established in the act. A 2012 
supplement to the law further establishes that the Ombudsman’s Office “will be part of the 
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Plurinational Council…together with the President of the State, national assembly and 
representatives of social organizations, among others” (Díez Lacunza 2016, 1). Although 
Benecio Quispe, an environmental lawyer, was appointed as ombudsman in February 2014, he 
has not brought forth any cases on behalf of the rights of nature. (Chávez 2014). Instead, Quispe 
has focused his attention on drafting legislation to protect specific environmental sectors such as 
mining and waterways (Chávez 2014). In fact, no cases have been successful in appealing to the 
rights of nature in Bolivia since the adoption of the Law on the Rights of Mother Earth.  
 Many scholars and activists have speculated on the shortcomings of the law in practice 
and two main themes stand out (Sheehan 2015; Herold 2017). On the one hand, science is not 
keeping pace with new ways of thinking about ‘nature.’ Linda Sheehan (2015) points out that 
science is “still overwhelmingly reductionist, breaking down the natural world into pieces to 
study and manipulate” instead of considering “the Earth's ecosystems holistically as natural 
systems that also include people” (105). Here we can see where there might be difficulty in 
translating complex concepts like ‘assemblages’ into legal discourse. There is a disconnect 
between the conception of agency as inextricably linked between humans and nonhumans and 
scientific and political practices that seem to be stuck in old ways of environmental management 
discourse. Bruno Latour (2004) foresaw this dilemma:  
 The challenge is not to take a position in the debate that is going to make it possible to 
 measure the respective shares of nature and society in the representations we have of 
 them, but to modify the conception of the social and political world that serves as 
 evidence for the social and natural sciences (34).  
Latour’s collective experimentation process provides a framework for modifying the ‘conception 
of the social and political world’ while simultaneously bringing scientific practices into 
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democracy that better reflect a nonbifurcated nature (34). Successfully uprooting anthropocentric 
conceptions of ‘nature’ entails that we not only change our public moods, aesthetic-affective 
styles, and cultural attitudes, but also our institutions of science, politics, and so forth.  
 A second shortcoming of rights of nature in both Bolivia and Ecuador is their reliance on 
extractive industries which comprises 13 and 15 percent of their total GDP respectively (Herold 
2017). Although Evo Morales promised to challenge the neo-liberal development paradigm and 
advance the rights of nature, the legal and political will to enforce the law has been minimal. The 
division between humans and nonhumans, or society and ‘nature,’ is still deeply embedded in 
Bolivia’s economy, politics, and institutions of science, as detailed above. In order for post-
humanist ecology to translate into practice, there must be both bottom-up pressure from new 
cultural attitudes, and top-down support from institutions that can reinforce these new 
conceptions of ‘nature’ and vital materiality of nonhuman entities. While the New Zealand 
Whanganui River Deed is not without flaws as well, it seems to do a better job of balancing 
between bottom-up and top-down strategies than its Ecuadorian and Bolivian counterparts.   
Rights of Nature in New Zealand 
 The rights of nature in New Zealand have developed somewhat differently than in the 
cases of Ecuador and Bolivia. Instead of granting broad legal rights to nature, New Zealand has 
so far recognized only the Whanganui River as a rights bearing entity. There has been a long 
history of tension between the Maori people and New Zealand Crown over the river, dating back 
to the first Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Up until the 1970s, agreements made between the Crown 
and Maori followed Eurocentric norms regarding private property and resource rights that were 
to be administered by the government (Magallanes 2015; Hsiao 2012). The Maori mobilized in 
the early 1970s, calling for the inclusion of their cosmology in legal and political discourse, 
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culminating in the creation Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 (Magallanes 2015). The Tribunal marked 
the beginning of the Crown’s recognition of Maori beliefs, and “the loss of Maori authority over 
land and resources” began to be discussed “in terms of the loss of relationships more than the 
loss of resource value” (Magallanes 2015, 295). Further, the Resource Management Act of 1991 
specifically called for including kaitiakitanga and other Maori cultural traditions in decision-
making regarding the stewardship of ‘nature’ (Magallanes 2015).  
 The increasing inclusion of Maori cosmology in legal frameworks has engendered a 
move toward rights of nature legislation in recent negotiations involving the Whanganui River. 
Deliberations in 2011 marked the first year of recognition of the Whanganui River as a rights 
bearing entity, creating a framework for future negotiations between the Whanganui Iwi and the 
Crown” (Hsiao 2012). In 2014, the Whanganui River Deed of Settlement—also known as 
Ruruku Whakatupua—entered into law. The Whanganui River Deed consists of two parts. Part 
one (Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua) of the deed lays out the legal framework for recognizing the 
river as a living entity while part two (Te Mana o Te Iwi o Whanganui) focuses on cultural and 
financial redress for the Maori people, including a formal apology from the Crown. The redress 
and apology were meant to strengthen the relationship between the Crown and the Maori and to 
symbolize the inclusion of the Maori people in future decision-making (NZ Government 2014). 
The Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua emphasizes Maori cosmology, linking their views to the rights of 
nature and guardianship of the Whanganui River. A textual analysis of the Whangui River Deed 
also reveals how Bennett’s ‘vital materialism’ and Latour’s ‘parliament of things’ might work in 
practice.  
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Whanganui River Deed of Settlement  
 The Whanganui River Deed is written in both English and the native Maori language and 
focuses on the intrinsic value of the river as understood by the Maori people. Section 2 of the 
document makes clear that the river, called Te Awa Tupua by the Maori, is a legal person and 
living entity. The Maori saying, “I am the river and the river is me” is frequently invoked 
throughout the document as it symbolizes the Maori peoples’ “inalienable interconnection with, 
and responsibility to Te Awa Tupua and its health and wellbeing” (Section 2, Article 7.3). 
Recalling from chapter three, this “inalienable interconnection” is rooted in ancestral ties to 
nonhuman entities known as whakapapa, and “responsibility to Te Awa Tupua” stems from the 
Maori practice of kaitiakitanga. It is through the recognition of Maori ties to the river as an 
ancestor that the river has come to possess legal status. In fact, the Deed is first and foremost, a 
means to advance the Maori worldview (Diprose and Bond 2016; Magallanes 2015).  
 The legal status of the Whanganui River came as a result of the inclusion of Maori beliefs 
regarding ancestral ties to nonhuman entities and the enduring bond between Maori communities 
and ‘nature.’ In this case, attitudes about ‘nature’ and the intrinsic vitality of nonhumans can not 
only translate into legal frameworks, but they can also shift the way in which we bring 
nonhuman entities into the political realm. This appears to be what Bennett is suggesting when 
she says that ecological issues are “as much a matter of culture-and-psyche-formation as [they 
are] of watershed management and air quality protection” (114). Indeed, Catherine Magallanes 
(2015) points out that “despite not stemming from the environmentalist rights of nature 
approach” the Whanganui River Deed was still “designed to better protect the natural 
environment and to better recognise an alternative relationship between humans and nature” 
(295). The manner in which rights of nature have played out in New Zealand seems to better 
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reflect Bennett’s description of how vital materialism can influence politics, rather than fitting 
into traditional rights discourse and western-centered legal frameworks. However, it is worth 
noting that the Whanganui River was only compulsorily recognized after Maori individual rights 
were recognized. Of course, there is no distinction between these two domains for the Maori as 
there is no true sense of an individual separate from ‘nature.’  
 Although the Deed only confers legal status onto the Whanganui River, it shares with the 
cases of Ecuador and Bolivia its acknowledgement of nonhumans as entities within a totality, 
much like assemblages and ecosystems operate. For the Maori people, the Te Awa Tupua “is a 
singular entity comprised of many elements and communities, working collaboratively” with the 
common purpose to ensure the longevity of the entire system (Section 2, Article 7.4). To 
recognize the Maori worldview in law is to simultaneously recognize the inherent rights and 
significance of every other entity bound up with the Maori way of life. This is especially true in 
the case of Maori indigenous peoples whose cultural rights are not only dependent on the 
recognition of nonhuman entities as vital materialities, but also on the Maori people’s ability to 
care for them. Unlike the legal frameworks in Ecuador and Bolivia, the Whanganui River Deed 
specifically appoints several representatives to speak on behalf of the river in terms of its health, 
wellbeing, and importance to Maori communities.  
Implementation and Enforcement 
 Section 3 of the Whanganui River Deed deals specifically with the appointment of the Te 
Pou Tupua, a singular “role exercised jointly by two persons” who are to be the “human face and 
act in the name of” the Whanganui River (Articles 3.7 and 3.1, respectively). The Te Pou Tupua 
representatives have a lot in common with Latour’s spokespersons, and are better defined than 
the Defensoría de la Madre Tierra of Brazil. Rather than being scientists themselves, who 
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collaborate with politicians on matters of concern, the Te Pou Tupua act as a liaison between 
different sectors within society. They not only engage with Maori community members on the 
status of the river in terms of cultural indicators, such as the CHI, but also all relevant agencies 
who regularly report on the river’s status (Section 3, Articles 4.1-4.5). Moreover, they have a 
public role to report matters of concern involving the river to the proper authorities, while also 
having the power to “develop and review guidelines and policies” that pertain to ensuring the 
river’s wellbeing (Section 3, Articles 4.3-4.4). 
 There are two important rules that involve the appointment of the Te Pou Tupua 
representatives. First, they are to be experts “of high standing, recognising both the importance 
of the role and the need to interact with Ministers and other agencies, Iwi and Hapu [Maori 
tribes], organisations, and communities at a leadership level” (Section 3, Article 3.8). Second, 
one of the representatives is to be from the New Zealand Crown, jointly appointed by the 
Minster of Treaty Negotiations and the Minister of Justice, and the other a Maori person, 
appointed democratically from the Iwi tribe (Section 3, Articles 18-23). The Deed also 
establishes a budget for the office of the Te Pou Tupua at $200,000 a year until at least 2035 (NZ 
Department of Treasury 2015). Remarkably, representation for the Whanganui River does not 
stop at the Te Pou Tupua as there is also an advisory group consisting of 6 members from 
municipal authorities and a strategy group consisting of 17 members (Section 3, Articles 27-28). 
The strategy group is to be assembled from several stakeholder groups including, but not limited 
to, the Director-General of Conservation, the NZ Fish and Game Council, the energy, tourism, 
and primary industry sectors, and several different environmental organizations (Section 4, 
Articles 29-34).  
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 The appointment of various stakeholders who are to speak on behalf of the Whanganui 
River and their relative interests conforms with Bruno Latour’s proposal that we should not 
“homogenize those which participate in the power” to prioritize and take into account what is 
important for collective life (2004, 113). This consultation process is a key requirement in 
Latour’s ‘parliament of things.’ If an issue were to arise regarding the health of the Whanganui 
River, every stakeholder would have a different perspective on the problem and different level of 
expertise in the matter. As Latour puts it, “laboratories do research, farmers investigate, 
consumers worry, veterinarians point out symptoms, epidemiologists analyze their statistics, 
journalists probe, cows mill about, [and] sheep get the shakes” (2010, 112). While each 
spokesperson should be aware of their own limits and interests in speaking on behalf of the 
Whanganui River, it is also important that the consultation process be democratic and 
deliberative in nature. What is most interesting in the case of New Zealand spokespersons is that, 
as their cultural practices indicate, Maori interests in the river will not be vested in its monetary 
and instrumental value, but in its intrinsic value as a lively materiality. The opening up of 
political discourse to include Maori cosmologies provides a potential avenue for a broader 
cultural diffusion of conceptions about nonhuman entities and ‘nature.’  
 Although this consultation process may provide a useful vehicle for the Maori to spread 
their conception of ‘nature’ to other groups within New Zealand society, the Whanganui River 
Deed is not without criticism. As Hutchison (2014) points out, “parts of the river that were 
privately owned will remain privately owned, and will continue to be seen as property” (9). This 
means the rights of the river are upheld only insofar as they do not conflict with the well-
established, western practice of the human right to property. Although New Zealand has included 
Maori beliefs into the framework of the Deed, it still does not legally challenge hierarchies of 
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power, either between the Crown and Maori, or humans and ‘nature.’ However, including 
indigenous views in legal frameworks can challenge hierarchies of power through the 
normalization of alternative worldviews. While some scholars (Scheingold 1974; Kalman 1996) 
have argued that laws are entrenched in already established hierarchies of power and cannot 
produce lasting social and cultural change, others have argued that laws can be powerful tools for 
empowering activists and changing attitudes and behavior (Cooter 1998; Sunstein 1996; 
Silverstein 1996; McCann 1998). What sets the above rights of nature laws apart from this 
scholarship is that there are already indigenous peoples providing evidence of how these 
alternative belief systems can work in community-level practice. In so doing, they are also giving 
us a glimpse of the potential benefits of post-humanist ecologies as they move from social 




CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 Rights of nature laws can tell us quite a bit about the potential political implications of 
post-humanist ecologies. In particular, post-humanist ecologies can shape new cultural attitudes 
and inform new political and legal discourses that are mutually reinforcing. Indigenous 
Amazonian and Maori practices and beliefs tell us that we can build ecologically-minded 
communities by recognizing the vitality of nonhuman entities and our interconnectedness with 
‘nature.’ When we look closely through their lenses, we can begin to uncover the various actants 
with whom we share agency. As Bennett suggests, these conceptions of nonhuman human 
entities can create a new self-interest. That is, if we step outside ourselves, we can see that it is 
not the monetary value of ‘things’ and liberal philosophies of individualism that define who ‘we’ 
are, but the actions of many interdependent human and nonhuman bodies and forces. For now, 
rights of nature laws tell us that when post-humanist perspectives of ecology move into the 
political realm, there are several concurrent procedures that must follow. 
 While it may be possible to include indigenous cosmologies and post-humanist concepts 
in the text of legal documents, rights of nature implementation and enforcement in Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and New Zealand indicate that it is not nearly as easy to carry them out in practice. This 
is especially the case when deeply embedded hierarchies of power and neo-liberal economics 
already govern political systems throughout the world. Fortunately, Latour provides us with 
some indications for what a politics including nonhuman nature should look like. While rights of 
nature laws in Ecuador and Bolivia do not provide adequate representation for nonhumans, New 
Zealand’s Whanganui River has a healthy assortment of parties who can collaborate on its well-
being. However, even New Zealand’s law is undermined by private property rights which places 
the river in a strange predicament, wherein it is both an object to be owned and a vibrant 
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materiality to be valued in its own right. This predicament reveals that it is not enough to put in 
place spokespersons, no matter how many there are, as they still risk being restricted by 
prevailing sentiments of (and rules governing) a neo-liberal, capitalist society. It is difficult to 
tell which should come first in this respect, i.e. should we focus our attention on creating a 
bottom-up cultural disposition oriented toward the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, or the 
top-down legal mechanisms that can ensure they are recognized as lively materialities by the 
state? Of course, there is no easy answer to this question. As I discussed in the last chapter, rights 
of nature seem to require more than just a shift in legal frameworks. Economic, scientific, and 
even educational institutions will need to be reworked to reflect post-humanist perspectives. This 
leads me to believe that bottom-up reconfigurations of cultural attitudes are indispensable to a 
successful post-humanist political project.  
 It is worth noting that rights of nature laws have been born out of a political context that 
is currently evolving. On the one hand, indigenous peoples in Ecuador, Bolivia, and New 
Zealand have been gaining more rights and political recognition. On the other hand, they must 
assimilate their beliefs and practices into western-centered legal frameworks even when those 
frameworks run contrary to their cosmologies. This collision of ideologies provides an 
interesting glimpse of the challenges post-humanist ecologies may face as they move into the 
political and legal realm. Although I have outlined several connections between post-humanist 
ecologies and indigenous imaginaries, not all Amazonian and Maori beliefs and practices are 
entirely representative of these post-humanist concepts. Studying other indigenous belief systems 
may shed new light into how post-humanist ecologies might work in practice. Or, there may be 
other, nonindigenous groups that already exist or are currently mobilizing around post-humanist 
perspectives. Certainly, ongoing research should keep track of these developments. Meanwhile, 
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other studies may want to explore how local level rights of nature laws have been gaining 
momentum and what challenges they face as they too might provide insight into possible 
political implications of post-humanist ecologies.  
 For now, we know that post-humanist ecologies can inform ecologically-minded 
practices as indigenous practices and beliefs have indicated. Moving further into the 
Anthropocene will hopefully inspire a more robust move toward ecologically-minded politics. 
Whether or not post-humanist perspectives of ecology will be the philosophy states adopt in 
future political and legal frameworks remains to be seen. For now, we do know is that it is 
possible to incorporate post-humanist perspectives of ecology into western-legal frameworks as 
the cases of Ecuador, Bolivia, and New Zealand have indicated. If we continue to create new 
public moods that reflect these philosophies, the political momentum and will to challenge old 
hierarchies of power will only grow stronger and become more effective in addressing the 
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APPENDIX A: ECUADORIAN CONSTITUTION (EXCERPT) 
Chapter 1- Entitlement. 
 
 Persons and people have the fundamental rights guaranteed in this Constitution and in the 
international human rights instruments. Nature is subject to those rights given by this 
Constitution and Law. 
 
Chapter 7- Rights of Nature 
 
 Article 71. Nature, or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to 
integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, 
structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples and nations 
can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and interpret these 
rights, the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as appropriate. The State 
shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to communities to protect nature 
and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an ecosystem. 
 
Article 72. Nature has the right to be restored. This restoration shall be apart from the 
obligation of the State and natural persons or legal entities to compensate individuals and 
communities that depend on affected natural systems. In those cases of severe or permanent 
environmental impact, including those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural 
resources, the State shall establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and 
shall adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental consequences. 
 
Article 73. The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures on activities that 
might lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the permanent 
alteration of natural cycles. The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material 
that might definitively alter the nation’s genetic assets is forbidden. 
 
Article 74. Persons, communities, peoples, and nations shall have the right to benefit 
from the environment and the natural wealth enabling them to enjoy the good way of living. 
Environmental services shall not be subject to appropriation; their production, delivery, use and 
development shall be regulated by the State. 
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APPENDIX B: BOLIVIAN LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER EARTH 
 
Chapter 1: Objects and Principles 
 
Article 1. (Scope). This Act is intended to recognize the rights of Mother Earth, and the 
obligations and duties of the Multinational State and society to ensure respect for these rights.  
 
Article 2. (Principles). The binding principles that govern this law are: 
 
1. Harmony. Human activities, within the framework of plurality and diversity, should achieve a 
dynamic balance with the cycles and processes inherent in Mother Earth. 
2. Collective good. The interests of society, within the framework of the rights of Mother Earth, 
prevail in all human activities and any acquired right. 
3. Guarantee of the regeneration of Mother Earth. The state, at its various levels, and society, in 
harmony with the common interest, must ensure the necessary conditions in order that the 
diverse living systems of Mother Earth may absorb damage, adapt to shocks, and regenerate 
without significantly altering their structural and functional characteristics, recognizing that 
living systems are limited in their ability to regenerate, and that humans are limited in their 
ability to undo their actions. 
4. Respect and defend the rights of Mother Earth. The State and any individual or collective 
person must respect, protect and guarantee the rights of Mother Earth for the well-being of 
current and future generations. 
5. No commercialism. Neither living systems nor processes that sustain them may be 
commercialized, nor serve anyone's private property. 
6. Multiculturalism. The exercise of the rights of Mother Earth requires the recognition, 
recovery, respect, protection, and dialogue of the diversity of feelings, values, knowledge, skills, 
practices, skills, transcendence, transformation, science, technology and standards, of all the 
cultures of the world who seek to live in harmony with nature. 
 
Chapter II: Mother Earth, Definition and Character 
 
Article 3. (Mother Earth). Mother Earth is a dynamic living system comprising an indivisible 
community of all living systems and living organisms, interrelated, interdependent and 
complementary, which share a common destiny. Mother Earth is considered sacred, from the 
worldviews of nations and peasant indigenous peoples. 
 
Article 4. (Living Systems). Living systems are complex and dynamic communities of plants, 
animals, microorganisms and other beings and their environment, where human communities 
and the rest of nature interact as a functional unit under the influence of climatic, physiographic, 
and geological factors, as well as production practices, Bolivian cultural diversity, and the 
worldviews of nations,  original indigenous peoples, and intercultural and Afro-Bolivian 
communities. 
 
Article 5. (Legal Status of Mother Earth). For the purpose of protecting and enforcing its rights, 
Mother Earth takes on the character of collective public interest. Mother Earth and all its 
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components, including human communities, are entitled to all the inherent rights recognized in 
this Law. The exercise of the rights of Mother Earth will take into account the specificities and 
particularities of its various components. The rights under this Act shall not limit the existence of 
other rights of Mother Earth. 
 
Article 6. (Exercise of the Rights of Mother Earth). All Bolivians, to join the community of 
beings comprising Mother Earth, exercise rights under this Act, in a way that is consistent with 
their individual and collective rights. The exercise of individual rights is limited by the exercise 
of collective rights in the living systems of Mother Earth. Any conflict of rights must be resolved 
in ways that do not irreversibly affect the functionality of living systems. 
 
Chapter III: Rights of Mother Earth 
 
Article 7. (Rights of Mother Earth). Mother Earth has the following rights: 
 
1. To life: The right to maintain the integrity of living systems and natural processes that sustain 
them, and capacities and conditions for regeneration. 
2. To the diversity of life: It is the right to preservation of differentiation and variety of beings 
that make up Mother Earth, without being genetically altered or structurally modified in an 
artificial way, so that their existence, functioning or future potential would be threatened. 
3. To water: The right to preserve the functionality of the water cycle, its existence in the 
quantity and quality needed to sustain living systems, and its protection from pollution for the 
reproduction of the life of Mother Earth and all its components. 
4. To clean air: The right to preserve the quality and composition of air for sustaining living 
systems and its protection from pollution, for the reproduction of the life of Mother Earth and all 
its components. 
5. To equilibrium: The right to maintenance or restoration of the interrelationship, 
interdependence, complementarity and functionality of the components of Mother Earth in a 
balanced way for the continuation of their cycles and reproduction of their vital processes. 
6. To restoration: The right to timely and effective restoration of living systems affected by 
human activities directly or indirectly. 
7. To pollution-free living: The right to the preservation of any of Mother Earth's components 
from contamination, as well as toxic and radioactive waste generated by human activities. 
Chapter IV: State Obligations and Societal Duties 
 
Article 8. (Obligations of the Plurinational State). The Plurinational State, at all levels and 
geographical areas and across all authorities and institutions, has the following duties: 
 
1. Develop public policies and systematic actions of prevention, early warning, protection, and 
precaution in order to prevent  human activities causing the extinction of living populations, the 
alteration of the cycles and processes that ensure life, or the destruction of livelihoods, including 
cultural systems that are part of Mother Earth. 
2. Develop balanced forms of production and patterns of consumption to satisfy the needs of the 
Bolivian people to live well, while safeguarding the regenerative capacity and integrity of the 
cycles, processes and vital balance of Mother Earth. 
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3. Develop policies to protect Mother Earth from the multinational and international scope of the 
exploitation of its components, from the commodification of living systems or the processes that 
support them, and from the structural causes and effects of global climate change. 
4. Develop policies to ensure long-term energy sovereignty, increased efficiency and the gradual 
incorporation of clean and renewable alternative sources into the energy matrix. 
5. Demand international recognition of environmental debt through the financing and transfer of 
clean technologies that are effective and compatible with the rights of Mother Earth, among 
other mechanisms.  
6. Promote peace and the elimination of all nuclear, chemical, and biological arms and weapons 
of mass destruction.  
7. Promote the growth and recognition of rights of Mother Earth in multilateral, regional and 
bilateral international relations. 
 
Article 9. (Duties of the People). The duties of natural persons and public or private legal 
entities: 
 
1. Uphold and respect the rights of Mother Earth. 
2. Promote harmony with Mother Earth in all areas of its relationship with other human 
communities and the rest of nature in living systems.  
3. Participate actively, individually or collectively, in generating proposals designed to respect 
and defend the rights of Mother Earth. 
4. Assume production practices and consumer behavior in harmony with the rights of Mother 
Earth. 
5. Ensure the sustainable use of Mother Earth's components. 
6. Report any act that violates the rights of Mother Earth, living systems, and/or their 
components. 
7. Attend the convention of competent authorities or organized civil society to implement 
measures aimed at preserving and/or protecting Mother Earth. 
 
Article 10. (Defense of Mother Earth). Establishing the Office of Mother Earth Ombudsman 
whose mission is to ensure the validity, promotion, distribution and compliance of the rights of 
Mother Earth established in this Act. A special law will establish its structure, function, and 
attributes. 
 
Refer to the Executive Branch for constitutional ends. 
It is given in the Assembly Hall of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, on the seventh day of 
the month of December two thousand and ten. 
 
Sen. René Oscar Martínez Callahuanca 
President, Chamber of Senators 
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APPENDIX C: NEW ZEALAND’S WHANGANUI RIVER DEED OF SETTLEMENT 
(EXCERPT) 
 
This document, Ruruku Whakatupua - Te Mana o Te Awa, contains the agreed terms of a 
new legal framework for Te Awa Tupua which upholds the mana of the Whanganui River and 




1. OVERARCHING PURPOSE OF TE PA AUROA NA TE AWA TUPUA 
 
1.3 The overarching purpose of Te Pa Auroa na Te Awa Tupua is to provide for: 
1.3.1 the legal recognition of Te Awa Tupua; 
1.3.2 the legal recognition and effect of Tupua te Kawa; 
1.3.3 the development and effect of Te Heke Ngahuru ki Te Awa Tupua; and 
1.3.4 the protection and promotion of the health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua. 
 
2. TE AWA TUPUA: An indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the sea 
The Great River flows from the mountains to the sea I am the River and the River is me. Te Awa 
Tupua is an indivisible and living whole comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to 
the sea, incorporating its tributaries and all its physical and metaphysical elements. 
 
TE AWA TUPUA AS A LEGAL PERSON 
 
2.2 Te Awa Tupua is a legal person. 
2.3 Te Awa Tupua has the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person. 
2.4 The rights, powers and duties of Te Awa Tupua must be exercised and performed on 
behalf of, and in the name of Te Awa Tupua: 
2.4.1 by Te Pou Tupua; and 
2.4.2 in accordance with this document. 
2.5 Te Pou Tupua is responsible for the liabilities of Te Awa Tupua. 
 
TUPUA TE KAWA 
2.6 Tupua te Kawa is a set of intrinsic values which represents the essence of Te Awa 
Tupua. 
2.7 Tupua te Kawa comprises: 
1. Ko Te Kawa Tuatahi 
Ko te Awa te matapuna o te ora (The River is the source of spiritual and physical 
sustenance) 
Te Awa Tupua is a spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains both the life 
and natural resources within the Whanganui River and the health and wellbeing of the 
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iwi, hapu and other communities of the River. 
2. Ko Te Kawa Tuarua 
E rere kau mai te Awa nui mai i te Kahui Maunga ki Tangaroa (The great River 
flows from the mountains to the sea) 
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the sea, 
incorporating the Whanganui River and all of its physical and metaphysical elements. 
3. Ko Te Kawa Tuatoru 
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au (I am the River and the River is me) 
The iwi and hapu of the Whanganui River have an inalienable interconnection with, and 
responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and wellbeing. 
4. Ko Te Kawa Tuawha 
Nga manga iti, nga manga nui e honohono kau ana, ka tupu hei Awa Tupua 
(The small and large streams that flow into one another and form one River) 
Te Awa Tupua is a singular entity comprised of many elements and communities, 





2.8 The Crown confirms its commitment to Te Awa Tupua and Tupua te Kawa. 
 
3. THE PURPOSE OF TE POU TUPUA 
 
3.1 The purpose of Te Pou Tupua is to be the human face and act in the name of Te Awa 
Tupua. 
3.2 In exercising its functions Te Pou Tupua must act in the interests of Te Awa Tupua and 
consistently with Tupua te Kawa. 
 
FUNCTIONS OF TE POU TUPUA 
 
3.3 The functions of Te Pou Tupua are to: 
3.3.1 act and speak on behalf of Te Awa Tupua; 
3.3.2 uphold: 
(a) the Te Awa Tupua status; and 
(b) Tupua te Kawa; 
3.3.3 Promote and protect the health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua; human face of Te Awa 
Tupua 
3.4 Without limiting clause 3.3, in exercising its functions Te Pou Tupua: 
3.4.1 must, in recognising the inalienable interconnection between the iwi and hapu 
of the Whanganui River and Te Awa Tupua, develop appropriate mechanisms 
for engaging with and reporting to those iwi and hapu on matters relating to Te 
Awa Tupua; 
3.4.2 may, from time to time, report publicly on matters relating to Te Awa Tupua; 
3.4.3 may engage with any relevant agency, decision-maker or other body to assist 
that agency, decision-maker or body in its understanding, application and 
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implementation of the Te Awa Tupua status and Tupua te Kawa including, if 
agreed, the development or review of relevant guidelines or policies; and 
3.4.4 may participate in relevant statutory processes. 
 
CAPACITY OF TE POU TUPUA 
 
3.5 Te Pou Tupua has full capacity to exercise its functions. 
 
APPOINTMENT OF TE POU TUPUA 
 
3.6 Te Pou Tupua is, through the appointment process, symbolic of the Treaty partnership 
between the Crown and iwi. 
3.7 Te Pou Tupua comprises a singular role exercised jointly by two persons. 
3.8 The two persons to be appointed to the position of Te Pou Tupua are intended to be 
persons of high standing, recognising both the importance of the role and the need to 
interact with Ministers and other agencies, iwi and hapu, organisations and 
communities at a leadership level. 
3.9 The two persons to be appointed to the position of Te Pou Tupua will be appointed by 
iwi with interests in the Whanganui River and the Crown ("appointers") as follows: 
3.9.1 one person will be nominated by iwi with interests in the Whanganui River; 
3.9.2 one person will be nominated by the Crown; and 
3.9.3 iwi with interests in the Whanganui River and the Crown will jointly and by 
agreement appoint two persons to the position of Te Pou Tupua: 
(a) based on the nominations referred to in clauses 3.9.1 and 3.9.2; and 
(b) having regard to the joint ability of the nominees to fulfil the purpose and 
exercise the functions of Te Pou Tupua. 
3.10 In making a nomination, the relevant nominator must be satisfied that the proposed nominee 
has the requisite mana, skills, knowledge and experience to achieve the purpose and exercise the 
functions of Te Pou Tupua.  
3.11 Prior to making a nomination, each nominator must give notice to the other nominator. 
3.12 Te Pou Tupua is appointed for a term of three years. 
 
 
Signed, 5 August 2014 
 Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and the Whanganui Iwi 
